The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1063.
On 7 June, the
MOD submitted its assessment of the ISF’s progress to
the
Cabinet
Office.978
Some of the
key points were:
•
The
programme was on target to complete by December 2006 with 80
percent
of the ISF
trained and equipped (less the forces in Anbar province and
the
Air Force
and Navy capability).
•
Higher‑level
command and control, logistics, equipment husbandry
and
intelligence
remained immature, but “significant improvement” was
expected
during
2006. MND(SE) had “some of the same issues” but they were
“less
acute” with
10th Division having received 97 percent of its “critical
items”.
•
Of the
Iraqi Army battalions and brigade/divisional headquarters, 50
percent
were
capable of planning, executing and sustaining
counter‑insurgency
operations.
The Iraqi people held the Iraqi Army “generally in high
regard”.
•
The police
were “some way behind” but “significant progress” was expected
by
the end of
the year. Their effectiveness rested on their credibility with the
Iraqi
people,
which was “increasing but remain[ed] an issue”.
•
Equipment
shortfalls in the police were attributed to MOI “over‑recruiting”
police
forces, by
“possibly 9,000 to 10,000 … in the South alone”. That was
“reportedly
to combat
unemployment”.
•
“The ISF in
MND(SE) should be capable of managing the threat that they
will
face but
could be quickly undermined by poor leadership.” The UK had
trained
22,000 IPS
officers out of an agreed number of 29,000.
1064.
On the Basra
Security Plan, the MOD wrote that “in seeking efficiencies
to
resource
the new initiatives proposed in the Basra paper, it would be
counter‑productive
to disrupt
established projects in MND(SE) … to then re‑invest in the same
sectors”. The
FCO was
exploring options to reduce the UK’s commitment to the Jordan
International
Police
Training College, which had the potential to save £3.5m “with
minimal impact
upon ISF
capacity‑building” although it “may meet with opposition in US
quarters”.
1065.
Writing about
the way ahead, the MOD report stated:
“As the
Iraqi security forces mature, Iraq’s partners will need to put
additional
resources
into areas such as the judiciary and courts which have been
relatively
neglected
but which are critical to enforcing law and order as security
forces. We
need to
caution against further growth in the size of the ISF whose
size/shape has
been
designed to be affordable in the long run …
“On the
whole, the advice of the UK personnel is appreciated by not only
the US,
but more
importantly the Iraqis. We must build on this influence, without
negating
the current
good work that is being planned and will soon be implemented
in
978
Minute
DJC/Iraq to Cabinet Office [junior official], 7 June 2006, ‘Iraq:
Strategy Group Workstrands’
attaching
Paper ‘Update on Progress of the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF)’.
298