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9.6  |  27 June 2007 to April 2008
intelligence and surveillance. But overall capability continues to develop and far
exceeds that of the police. Where violence has flared, combat units have been
reinforced from elsewhere without recourse to MNF re-intervention.
“III. The large majority of local Iraqi Police remains wholly ineffective in tackling
crime and turns a blind eye to sectarian, criminal and violent anti-MNF activity
by colleagues who are also members of Shia militias. National Police (NP) and
provincial special police units are more tactically capable, but the NP follows a
sectarian Shia agenda. The judiciary is also overstretched and underperforming.”
715.  On 21 December, MOD officials advised Mr Browne of the “probable imminent
release” of JAM1.339 The advice said:
“The DIRC met yesterday and concluded that [JAM1] can no longer be held as an
imperative threat to the security of Iraq … Every effort has been made … to ensure
that we retain a link to [JAM1] after his release. Some procedures have been agreed
in principle – but we judge that one way to help ensure that contact is maintained is
for [JAM1] not to be the final internee released so that he needs to remain in contact
to ensure that the release process smoothly continues to completion …”
“It will be for … /FCO to manage our relationship with [JAM1] post release, although
MND(SE) will retain a strong interest and involvement, both because of [JAM1]’s
importance to managing security in Basra and also because of continuing dialogue
with [JAM1] regarding possible future releases of those of his supporters who are
currently being detained by the US …”
716.  Mr Browne marked the advice “Noted” on 22 December.
717.  Maj Gen Binns met JAM1 on the morning of 21 December.340 A government official
working closely with the military reported that during the meeting JAM1 said that he had
not wanted to go to war with the British, but they had “occupied his country and attacked
his groups”. Now it was time for a fresh page and for reconstruction and reconciliation.
He wished that the process of negotiation had begun in 2004 or 2005 but it had been
impossible to find British interlocutors to take it on. He hoped that the process would
now be a model for the rest of Iraq to follow. There should be no further animosity
against the British Military and he hoped that British soldiers would get home safely. It
was agreed that JAM1’s release should be brought forward by a few hours, because of
security concerns.
718.  On the evening of 21 December, JAM1 left the Divisional Internment Facility in
Basra. The following day, officials made contact with JAM1 by email, and received a
response a day later.
339  Manuscript comment Browne on Minute Powell to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 21 December 2007,
‘Iraq Op TELIC: future detainee releases’.
340  Email government official working closely with the military, 23 December 2007, ‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]: End of Act 1, curtain up on Act 2’.
313
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