9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
intelligence
and surveillance. But overall capability continues to develop and
far
exceeds
that of the police. Where violence has flared, combat units have
been
reinforced
from elsewhere without recourse to MNF
re-intervention.
“III. The
large majority of local Iraqi Police remains wholly ineffective in
tackling
crime and
turns a blind eye to sectarian, criminal and violent anti-MNF
activity
by
colleagues who are also members of Shia militias. National Police
(NP) and
provincial
special police units are more tactically capable, but the NP
follows a
sectarian
Shia agenda. The judiciary is also overstretched and
underperforming.”
715.
On 21
December, MOD officials advised Mr Browne of the “probable
imminent
release” of
JAM1.339
The advice
said:
“The DIRC
met yesterday and concluded that [JAM1] can no longer be held as
an
imperative
threat to the security of Iraq … Every effort has been made … to
ensure
that we
retain a link to [JAM1] after his release. Some procedures have
been agreed
in
principle – but we judge that one way to help ensure that contact
is maintained is
for [JAM1]
not to be the final internee released so that he needs to remain in
contact
to ensure
that the release process smoothly continues to completion
…”
“It will be
for … /FCO to manage our relationship with [JAM1] post release,
although
MND(SE)
will retain a strong interest and involvement, both because of
[JAM1]’s
importance
to managing security in Basra and also because of continuing
dialogue
with [JAM1]
regarding possible future releases of those of his supporters who
are
currently
being detained by the US …”
716.
Mr Browne
marked the advice “Noted” on 22 December.
717.
Maj Gen Binns
met JAM1 on the morning of 21 December.340
A government
official
working
closely with the military reported that during the meeting JAM1
said that he had
not wanted
to go to war with the British, but they had “occupied his country
and attacked
his
groups”. Now it was time for a fresh page and for reconstruction
and reconciliation.
He wished
that the process of negotiation had begun in 2004 or 2005 but it
had been
impossible
to find British interlocutors to take it on. He hoped that the
process would
now be a
model for the rest of Iraq to follow. There should be no further
animosity
against the
British Military and he hoped that British soldiers would get home
safely. It
was agreed
that JAM1’s release should be brought forward by a few hours,
because of
security
concerns.
718.
On the evening
of 21 December, JAM1 left the Divisional Internment Facility
in
Basra. The
following day, officials made contact with JAM1 by email, and
received a
response a
day later.
339
Manuscript
comment Browne on Minute Powell to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 21
December 2007,
‘Iraq Op
TELIC: future detainee releases’.
340
Email
government official working closely with the military, 23 December
2007, ‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]:
End of Act 1, curtain up on Act 2’.
313