3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
731.
The UK
began an intense and determined effort to secure support for
the
draft
resolution.
732.
Between the
discussion in the Security Council on 24 February and the
reports
to the
Security Council from Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei on 7
March, the UK, US and Spain
began an
intense and determined effort to try to persuade the members of the
Council,
and other
allies, to support the draft resolution.
733.
The campaign
included letters from Mr Blair, telephone calls, meetings and
visits
by
Ministers and Sir David Manning, as well as discussions in New York
and capitals
and public
statements in the US and UK.
734.
Mr Straw
and Secretary Powell discussed developments on 25 February
and
the
“troublesome” implications of the request for more time.
Mr Straw commented that
“everyone
was running for cover, finding any reason not to take action”. In
the tea room
of the
House of Commons, he had “found much support for continued
containment as
the best
way of avoiding unintended consequences”.217
735.
Iraq was
reported to have “dominated” the discussion during a meeting and
lunch
between
Mr Straw and Mr Fischer on 25 February.218
736.
The record
stated that “there was no meeting of minds”. Mr Fischer
had:
•
made it
clear that Germany could not vote for the UK/US/Spanish
resolution,
which in
“German eyes would lead directly to war”;
•
questioned
why the inspections should stop now;
•
suggested
that destruction of Al Samoud 2 missiles would “prove
resolution
1441 was
working”, and that there were “other hopeful signs”;
•
stated that
the German/French/Russian joint memorandum set out the
only
process
that would lead to peace; containment was working; and
•
stated that
“war would lead to serious repercussions; increased
terrorism;
insecurity
in the Middle East”.
737.
Mr Straw
was reported to have argued that the problem with Saddam
Hussein
was that:
“he had history of ‘stringing it out’. He only made concessions
which
represented
the bare minimum, under the threat of force, and at the last
minute.” The
joint
memorandum “made the error of putting the burden on the inspectors
to find Iraq’s
weapons of
mass destruction”; and that it “would merely lead to loose
containment not
disarmament”.
The burden should be on Saddam Hussein; he “could comply
quickly”
and, as
Mr Blair had said, “if Saddam complied, then he could stay in
power”. The joint
217
Telegram 87
FCO London to Washington, 25 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Conversation
with US
Secretary of State, 25 February’.
218
Telegram 33
FCO London to Berlin, 25 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s
Lunch with German
Foreign
Minister, 25 February’.
309