3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
looking for
a real solution” in the Security Council. There was “a slim chance
that war
could be
avoided within the next 3-4 days”. He would be holding a press
conference
in three
hours.
556.
Mr Blair
had responded that it was not clear how things would develop.
The
Security
Council “did not want to vote on a resolution that would be vetoed.
Both France
and Russia
were very clear that they would not allow a resolution which
authorised the
use of
force.”
557.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported at 5.50pm on 14 March that the US, UK
and
Spanish
Permanent Representatives had met early that morning to discuss how
to react
to the new
proposal forming amongst the “middle-ground six (U-6)”. They had
agreed:
•
the
proposal that “the Council would meet at the end of an ultimatum
period to
decide on
Iraq’s co-operation towards compliance with the tests was
completely
unacceptable”;
and
•
to “major
on the primacy of 1441” and tell contacts that “if any of
the
U-6
abandoned that baseline, they would do huge damage to
the
558.
President
Lagos telephoned No.10 that evening and, in the absence of
Mr Blair,
spoke to
Mr Rycroft to draw attention to the key points in his
statement, including the
benchmarks
proposed by the UK and a deadline of three weeks, not longer,
reflecting
559.
Mr Rycroft
also reported that President Lagos would not push the proposal
further
unless
President Bush or Mr Blair wanted him to; and that he [Lagos]
had not received
any
reaction from other Security Council members.
560.
An unofficial
translation of President Lagos’ statement produced by the
British
Embassy
Santiago reported that it expressed “full understanding of the
United States
concern for
the threats posed to its security”, which were “also threats to
world
security”.188
It also
stated that Chile continued to make “best efforts to avert war”
while
fully
supporting the “UN decision aimed at bringing to full and verified
compliance the
Iraqi
disarmament process” mandated in resolution 1441. President Lagos
referred
to “a special
co-operative bond”, which Chile had established with the
UK.
561.
The proposal
was “for the Security Council to impose … five critical
conditions”
derived
from the inspection process which should be fulfilled “within a
realistic time
period not
later than three weeks as from the date on which they are approved
by the
Security
Council”. Verification of compliance was to be reported by
inspectors with the
Security
Council controlling the decisions that followed.
186
Telegram
441 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: End
Game’.
187
Letter
Rycroft to Owen, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Chile: 14
March’.
188
Letter
British Embassy Santiago to No.10, 14 March 2003, ‘Statements by
President Lagos’.
495