Previous page | Contents | Next page
3.8  |  Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March 2003
looking for a real solution” in the Security Council. There was “a slim chance that war
could be avoided within the next 3-4 days”. He would be holding a press conference
in three hours.
556.  Mr Blair had responded that it was not clear how things would develop. The
Security Council “did not want to vote on a resolution that would be vetoed. Both France
and Russia were very clear that they would not allow a resolution which authorised the
use of force.”
557.  Sir Jeremy Greenstock reported at 5.50pm on 14 March that the US, UK and
Spanish Permanent Representatives had met early that morning to discuss how to react
to the new proposal forming amongst the “middle-ground six (U-6)”. They had agreed:
the proposal that “the Council would meet at the end of an ultimatum period to
decide on Iraq’s co-operation towards compliance with the tests was completely
unacceptable”; and
to “major on the primacy of 1441” and tell contacts that “if any of the
U-6 abandoned that baseline, they would do huge damage to the
Security Council”.186
558.  President Lagos telephoned No.10 that evening and, in the absence of Mr Blair,
spoke to Mr Rycroft to draw attention to the key points in his statement, including the
benchmarks proposed by the UK and a deadline of three weeks, not longer, reflecting
Mr Blair’s advice.187
559.  Mr Rycroft also reported that President Lagos would not push the proposal further
unless President Bush or Mr Blair wanted him to; and that he [Lagos] had not received
any reaction from other Security Council members.
560.  An unofficial translation of President Lagos’ statement produced by the British
Embassy Santiago reported that it expressed “full understanding of the United States
concern for the threats posed to its security”, which were “also threats to world
security”.188 It also stated that Chile continued to make “best efforts to avert war” while
fully supporting the “UN decision aimed at bringing to full and verified compliance the
Iraqi disarmament process” mandated in resolution 1441. President Lagos referred
to “a special co-operative bond”, which Chile had established with the UK.
561.  The proposal was “for the Security Council to impose … five critical conditions”
derived from the inspection process which should be fulfilled “within a realistic time
period not later than three weeks as from the date on which they are approved by the
Security Council”. Verification of compliance was to be reported by inspectors with the
Security Council controlling the decisions that followed.
186  Telegram 441 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: End Game’.
187  Letter Rycroft to Owen, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Chile: 14 March’.
188  Letter British Embassy Santiago to No.10, 14 March 2003, ‘Statements by President Lagos’.
495
Previous page | Contents | Next page