The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
748.
Mexico had
raised questions about the legal effect of the UK draft and whether
it
signalled
that peaceful means had been exhausted and whether a third Council
decision
would be
needed for the use of force.
749.
Sir Jeremy
suggested that “consistent with being legally accurate”, the
“most
persuasive
answers” might be along the lines that:
“•
the
resolution itself asked the Council to conclude that Iraq had
failed to take
its final
opportunity to comply. This was something on which, given Iraq’s
pattern
of non
co-operation, the Council should be able to unite;
•
the
consequence of that judgement, deriving from 1441 and
previous
resolutions,
was that force would be authorised;
•
this did
not mean that the resolution would lead to the use of force or
that
peaceful
means were exhausted. Rather, with a clear Council decision …
there
was still a
chance of last minute radical moves by the Iraqis. We recognised
that
the
probability of Iraq taking that chance … was low, but it was
perhaps the only
route by
which we could secure disarmament and a peaceful
outcome.”
750.
Sir Jeremy
also reported that Mr Lavrov had suggested the inspectors had
said
that there
were no false statements and Iraq’s submission of 30 documents
might have
rectified
the omissions in the declaration.
751.
Sir Jeremy
emphasised the importance of the Council meeting on 27
February
and asked
for “additional detailed punchy arguments” he could
deploy.
752.
Reporting
discussions in New York on 26 February, Sir Jeremy Greenstock
wrote:
•
There
remained “a general antipathy to having now to take decisions
on
this issue,
and a wariness about what our underlying motives are
behind
the resolution”.
•
The German
position was that the process of inspections had not
been
exhausted;
the work programme and key tasks envisaged in resolution
1284,
which had
not been revoked, had not begun; it had good reason to suspect
that
that Iraq
had WMD, but there was no proof and it could turn out that
Saddam
Hussein was
telling the truth.
•
The US
position was that resolution 1441 had found Iraq in material
breach
and partial
compliance would not do. Continued inspections was, in
effect,
an argument
for containment; and “Business as usual” would not produce
the
radical
Iraqi transformation needed. The US was willing to ensure
disarmament
by itself
if necessary and the Council had to factor that into its
decisions.226
753.
Sir Jeremy
reported that he had argued that the UK had not given up on a
peaceful
outcome.
The second resolution would maximise pressure on Saddam Hussein
and
226
Telegram
314 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 27 February 2003, ‘Iraq: 26
February’.
312