The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

295.  The IPU paper was considered by the AHMGIR on 4 September.261 The minutes

recorded that the IPU stated:

“The US had elaborate plans for Security Sector Reform, but faster action was

needed. We should give priority to the rapid expansion of the Civil Defence

Corps and the Facilities Protection Service … We should consider encouraging

neighbourhood security schemes and working with tribal leaders in rural areas.”

296.  Sir Jeremy Greenstock was recorded as warning that the proposals “were not

enough to bring the impact required in the short term”.

297.  Ministers agreed that ideas in the paper were “useful but required further work

which should be taken forward urgently”.

298.  Ahead of a video conference with President Bush on 5 September (see

Section 6.2), Mr Blair sent the President a Note which stated:

“Iraq has 37,000 police. We need to double that. Given the number of trainers and

their facilities, that will take a year. We cannot wait that long. So: if we need to treble

or quadruple the trainers and expand the numbers of Iraqi police even beyond

that contemplated, we should do it. Some of the Governing Council believe that in

certain areas, they should decide how far to take de‑Ba’athification in order to speed

up the process. There may be good constraints/reasons why these things should

not happen or take time, but we have to be very clear that the priority is to get

movement fast. There must also be a top quality intelligence capability given to the

Iraqis to act on the threat. This is essential.”262

299.  The record of the video conference between Mr Blair and President Bush stated

that Mr Blair said a “big push” was required in boosting numbers and speeding up

training of Iraqi Security Forces.263

300.  The IPU provided a more detailed paper entitled ‘Security Action Plan’ for the

inaugural meeting of the Iraq Senior Officials Group on 9 September (the creation of

which is addressed in Section 9.2).264 The IPU maintained that the focus should be on

the ICDC and the police “as the most likely to produce quick results, while continuing

to support the longer‑term development of the New Iraqi Army”. It did not address

Mr Blair’s concept of trebling the trainers available or expanding Iraqi police numbers.

301.  For ICDC development, the IPU said that more UK Short Term Training Teams

were required and that national funding should be used to avoid “procedural delays”.

261  Minutes, 4 September 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

262  Letter Sheinwald to Rice, 5 September 2003 attaching ‘Note on Iraq’.

263  Letter Canon to Adams, 5 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Video‑Conference with Bush,

5 September’.

264  Paper IPU, 8 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Security Action Plan’.

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