Executive
Summary
•
The reports
to the Security Council by the IAEA reported increasing
indications
of Iraqi
co‑operation. On 7 March, Dr ElBaradei reported that there was
no
indication
that Iraq had resumed nuclear activities and that it should be
able
to provide
the Security Council with an assessment of Iraq’s activities in
the
near future.
•
Dr Blix
reported to the Security Council on 7 March that there had been
an
acceleration
of initiatives from Iraq and, while they did not constitute
immediate
co‑operation,
they were welcome. UNMOVIC would be proposing a work
programme
for the Security Council’s approval, based on key tasks for Iraq
to
address. It
would take months to verify sites and items, analyse
documents,
interview
relevant personnel and draw conclusions.
•
A revised
draft US, UK and Spanish resolution, tabled after the reports by
Dr Blix
and
Dr ElBaradei on 7 March and proposing a deadline of 17 March
for Iraq to
demonstrate
full co‑operation, also failed to attract support.
•
China,
France and Russia all stated that they did not favour a
resolution
authorising
the use of force and that the Security Council should maintain
its
efforts to
find a peaceful solution.
•
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock advised that a “side statement” with defined
benchmarks
for Iraqi
co‑operation could be needed to secure support from Mexico and
Chile.
•
Mr Blair
told President Bush that he would need a majority of nine votes in
the
Security
Council for Parliamentary approval for UK military
action.
806.
The following
key findings are from Section 4.1:
•
The
ingrained belief that Saddam Hussein’s regime retained chemical
and
biological
warfare capabilities, was determined to preserve and if
possible
enhance its
capabilities, including at some point in the future a
nuclear
capability,
and was pursuing an active policy of deception and concealment,
had
underpinned
the UK Government’s policy towards Iraq since the Gulf
Conflict
ended in
1991.
•
Iraq’s
chemical, biological and ballistic missile programmes were seen as
a
threat to
international peace and security in the Middle East, but overall,
the
threat from
Iraq was viewed as less serious than that from other key
countries
of concern
– Iran, Libya and North Korea.
•
The
Assessments issued by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)
reflected the
uncertainties
within the intelligence community about the detail of Iraq’s
activities.
•
The
statements prepared for, and used by, the UK Government in public
from
late 2001
onwards conveyed more certainty than the JIC Assessments
about
Iraq’s
proscribed activities and the potential threat they
posed.
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