6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
1012.
When the
Chiefs of Staff met on 6 November they noted that there were
two
options for
the employment of a UK land force in the North: either integration
in a
division
under US command or the formation of a separate division, for which
the UK
would
provide the HQ and a square brigade, possibly sweeping up Coalition
partners.400
1013.
The meeting
was also informed that:
•
The total
UK contribution “currently remained Medium Scale” and it did not
follow
that the UK
contribution would increase in the event that Op FRESCO was
no
longer
required.
•
Ministers
had “yet to be exposed” to work on a “Force‑on‑Mind and
media
strategy”
to cover the period immediately after the UN resolution was
adopted.
•
Package 3
had been “well received by the US”.
•
Until
further notice, discussions on UK deployment through Turkey would
be
“taken
forward through the US”.
1014.
The Chiefs of
Staff also considered a short paper produced by PJHQ on
the
practicalities
of conducting military operations during an Iraqi
summer.401
The
paper
concluded
that military operations would be possible but at reduced tempo and
with
increased
risk.
1015.
The Chiefs of
Staff noted the advice and asked for a revised paper within
a
1016.
Sir David
Manning sent Mr Blair the MOD paper and Mr Bowen’s
minute
summarising
its contents.403
Sir David
also wrote that he had sought Secretary Powell’s
views when
he had been in Washington the previous week.
1017.
A fifth
version of the SPG paper ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on Iraq’
was
produced on
6 November.404
This set
out three “broad Courses of Action (COA) to deliver
the end
state”:
•
Diplomatic
& Coercion: a UN
resolution and inspections. The UK
Government’s
main effort (“ME”) was creating and sustaining the resolution
of
the
international community. Saddam Hussein would need to be convinced
that
the
international community was “serious, but equally that compliance”
would
“reap its
rewards” and he was “not in a zero sum game”. The SPG
judged
400
Minutes, 6
November 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
401
Minute
Reith to PSO/CDS and SECCOS, 5 November 2002, ‘Warfighting in Iraq
in the Summer’.
402
Minutes, 6
November 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
403
Manuscript
comment Manning to Prime Minister, 8 November 2002, on Minute Bowen
to Manning,
8 November
2002, ‘Iraq: Fighting in the Summer’.
404
Paper
[SPG], 6 November 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on
Iraq’.
327