The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
It would
“make sense for UNMOVIC to identify some priorities” within
the
clusters.
He suggested VX, anthrax and SCUD missiles.
•
“… just
three months of inspections was ‘not fully satisfactory’ as a
decent
amount of
time to give the inspections effort. But that was a Council
decision.”
•
If the
Council voted for war, there would be a long term monitoring
requirement.
It would be
for the Council to decide whether UNMOVIC should go back
and
on what terms.
841.
Dr Blix
subsequently told the UK Mission that he could and would make
the
clusters
document available for the Security Council meeting on 7 March.
But
preparation
of the work programme and key remaining tasks would not be ready by
then.
842.
The UK Mission
also reported that Ambassador James Cunningham, US
Deputy
Permanent
Representative to the UN, had:
•
said he was
“not opposed to surfacing the clusters document … provided it
was
not
accompanied by the list of key remaining tasks”; and
•
agreed
that, “after any conflict, US forces should certainly be
accompanied
by UNMOVIC
inspectors to witness the uncovering of WMD and
missiles.
But there
was Pentagon resistance … and, if the resolution failed to
pass,
giving UNMOVIC
a role could be a difficult argument.”
843.
The UK
continued to provide information to UNMOVIC on potential targets
for
inspection
but, by late February, it was “less confident about these than some
of the
UNMOVIC
issued its quarterly report to the Security Council on 28
February.257
The UK
Permanent Mission to the UN in New York reported that UNMOVIC
had
concluded
that Iraq had been helpful on process but there was no explicit
conclusion
Other
points included:
•
The “clusters”
document could serve as an important source for the selection
of
key
remaining tasks.
•
Verified
disarmament would be “problematic” without co-operation and even
with
co-operation
it would take some time.
•
Results in
terms of disarmament had been very limited so far.
256
Minute DI
ACR [junior official] to DDI CPSG et al, 25 February 2003,
‘Proposed Targets for UNMOVIC
Briefing –
26/27 February 2003’.
257
UN Security
Council, 28 February 2003, ‘Note by the Secretary General’
(S/2003/232).
258
Telegram
323 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 28 February 2003, ‘Iraq: UNMOVIC
Quarterly Report’.
330