The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
604.
The
medium-term prospects paper assessed that Iraq had reached a
critical
juncture,
with violence at its highest ever level, reconciliation making
little headway and
public
services still in a parlous state.350
The UK’s
existing goal for Iraq was:
“A
democratic, stable, united and law-abiding Iraq … providing
effective,
representative
and inclusive government for all its people.”
That was
now likely to be the “best case outcome”, and unlikely to be
achievable in full.
The best
achievable outcome was likely to be:
“… an Iraq
which can govern and sustain itself nationally and provincially,
and
where
sectarian and other violence is contained short of the point where
it would
overwhelm
Iraq’s institutions and precipitate chaos and/or civil
war.”
Achieving
that outcome lay primarily in the hands of the Iraqi Government.
The UK’s
ability to
influence its decisions would continue to decline. The coalition’s
current
strategy of
direct support combined with building Iraqi capacity remained the
only
credible
way to exert influence.
605.
The paper
argued that Iraq’s economic success depended more on the
policies
and actions
of the Iraqi Government than on the backing of the international
community.
High oil
prices had bolstered Iraq’s finances, but the Iraqi Government
needed
assistance
in managing the economy, bringing about structural reforms, and
unblocking
domestic
investment to improve public services. The implications for the UK
were:
•
The UK’s
effort in Basra should be channelled as far as possible through
the
PRT, which
might need to continue work into 2008 in line with the planned
UK
military
effort.
•
DFID’s
programme should increasingly be directed at enabling the
Iraqi
Government
to tackle key challenges at the centre, including
reconciliation,
economic
management and critical capacity deficits.
606.
The DOP(I)
meeting touched only very briefly on the paper, as
Mr Browne
indicated
he would like more time to discuss and agree it formally at a later
date.351
607.
DOP(I)
discussed the medium-term prospects paper at their next meeting,
on
20 October.352
Mr Blair
was not present, so Mr Browne chaired the
meeting.
608.
Mr Browne
began by saying that the existing goal would be difficult to
achieve, but
Ministers
had to be certain that there was not more the UK could do before
accepting
anything
less.
350
Paper
DOP(I), 10 October 2006, ‘Iraq: Medium Term Prospects and
Implications’.
351
Minutes, 12
October 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
352
Minutes
(revised), 20 October 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
296