4.2 | Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

59. On 5 August, Mr Peter Watkins, Mr Hoon’s Principal Private Secretary, wrote to

Sir David Manning suggesting that there was “a need to bolster our public lines on Iraq

for the summer while not changing our fundamental posture that no decision has been

taken on military action”.27

60. Mr Watkins wrote that the Government was “likely to face a long hot summer of

media speculation about the possibility of military action”. He suggested strengthening

the presentation of existing lines and reinforcing them with recent quotes from Mr Blair

and others “about the WMD threat posed by Saddam Hussein”. MOD and FCO officials

were working on that but careful drafting would be required “to avoid foreshadowing the

document now under consideration in the Cabinet Office”. He added:

“The aim would be to reinforce the message that the threat is real, without

suggesting that we have determined any particular policy to counter it.”

61. Mr Watkins suggested there was a need for “some closely held inter-departmental

thinking on a contingent information strategy in support of any decision to take military

action against Iraq”.

62. Sir David Manning was not persuaded that action was needed immediately and

asked Ms Anna Wechsberg, one of Mr Blair’s two Private Secretaries for Foreign Affairs,

to follow up.28

63. Sir David also sent a copy of the minute and his comments to Mr Scarlett.

64. Ms Wechsberg spoke to Mr Hoon’s Private Office to say that No.10 was “not

enthusiastic” about the proposals. It was agreed that, unless the MOD identified “other

arguments for proceeding, the idea will be dropped for now”.29

65. In a minute on 8 August, reporting developments while Mr McKane had been on

leave, Mr Jim Drummond, Assistant Head OD Sec (Foreign Policy), wrote that, in the

context of the public debate on Iraq “raging on in the press”, Sir David Manning had

“been very clear that he wants no action taken on the release of the dossier or any

private briefing of those engaging in the debate”.30

66. Mr Drummond also reported that Mr John Williams, FCO Press Secretary (formerly

Head of FCO News Department), had told Mr Straw that “releasing the dossier would be

a bad idea because it has insufficient evidence to convince public opinion”.

27 Letter Watkins to Manning, 5 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Public Posture and Information Strategy’.

28 Manuscript comment Manning to Wechsberg, 6 August 2002, on Letter Watkins to Manning,

5 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Public Posture and Information Strategy’.

29 Manuscript comment Wechsberg, 7 August 2002, on Letter Watkins to Manning, 5 August 2002,

‘Iraq: Public Posture and Information Strategy’.

30 Minute Drummond to McKane, 8 August 2002, ‘Iraq’.

125