7 |
Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning
285.
At Cabinet on
20 March, Mr Blair concluded that the
Government:
“… should
lose no opportunity to propagate the reason, at every level and
as
widely as
possible, why we had arrived at a diplomatic impasse, and why it
was
necessary
to take action against Iraq. France had not been prepared to accept
that
Iraq’s
failure to comply with its obligations should lead to the use of
force to achieve
286.
In his memoir,
Mr Blair described his speech opening the debate on
18 March
as “the
most important speech I had ever made”.143
287.
Mr Blair
framed the decision for the House of Commons as a “tough” and
“stark”
choice
between “retreat” and holding firm to the course of action the
Government had
set.
Mr Blair stated that he believed “passionately” in the latter.
He deployed a wide
range of
arguments to explain the grounds for military action and to make a
persuasive
case for
the Government’s policy.144
288.
In setting out
his position, Mr Blair recognised the gravity of the debate
and the
strength of
opposition in both the country and Parliament to immediate military
action.
In his
view, the issue mattered “so much” because the outcome would not
just determine
the fate of
the Iraqi regime and the Iraqi people but would:
“…
determine the way in which Britain and the world confront the
central security
threat of
the 21st century, the development of the United Nations, the
relationship
between
Europe and the United States, the relations within the European
Union
and the
way in which the United States engages with the rest of the world.
So it
could hardly
be more important. It will determine the pattern of international
politics
for the next
generation.”
289.
On
18 March 2003, the House of Commons was asked:
•
to
recognise that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and long-range
missiles,
and its
continuing non-compliance with Security Council resolutions, posed
a
threat to
international peace and security; and
•
to support
the use of all means necessary to ensure the disarmament of
Iraq’s
weapons of
mass destruction, on the basis that the United Kingdom must
uphold
the
authority of the United Nations as set out in resolution 1441 and
many
resolutions
preceding it.
142
Cabinet
Conclusions, 20 March 2003.
143
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
144
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
18 March 2003, columns 760-774.
607