The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
882.
His review of
2003 assessed that the post-conflict administration had started
badly,
but that
Ambassador Bremer had “picked it up”.508
While
political violence pervaded
everything,
and reconciliation should have been pursued earlier:
“… in
stimulating the supply of essential services, in improving
community law and
order, in
organising the remarkable currency exchange and in generating
economic
activity
which is livelier than the statistics or the media show, Bremer has
returned
many of the
components of a semi-normal life to most Iraqis. The majority can
at
least
perceive that the opportunity to create a new life, and a new Iraq,
might be
worth
investing in.”
883.
On the CPA’s
media effort, Sir Jeremy assessed that:
“… the
prize for CPA ineptness … has to go to the Iraqi Media Network,
now
re‑christened
Al Iraqiya. With billions to spend and the world’s most powerful
media
industry to
draw from, the CPA has … produced a mouse, then another mouse
and
finally, at
end-year, a mouse. Subservience to Washington’s … requirements
and
sheer
dysfunctionality seem to have been the causes.”
884.
In his look
ahead to the end of Occupation, Sir Jeremy wrote that the
Coalition
faced a
significant challenge as it prepared to transfer
sovereignty.509
In
addition
to the
“violent opposition” and the fragility of the political process,
the principal
hurdles
included:
•
the very
slow flow of donor money, including US money, for
reconstruction;
•
essential
utilities and services being below target, leading to a loss of
support
and consent
for the Coalition; and
•
an
unemployment rate close to 50 percent.
885.
Sir Jeremy
concluded that the situation was “poised”. To come out well,
the
Coalition
needed “one more heavy investment of effort” in three areas:
military forces;
donor
funding; and civilian staffing.
Mr Blair’s
concern over the performance of the CPA’s media operation reached
its peak at
the end of
2003.
Mr Blair
and President Bush spoke by video conference on 4 December
2003.510
Mr Blair
suggested
that “those responsible” for slow progress on the media should be
given until
January to
improve things. If there was no improvement, an outside media
figure should
508
Telegram
332 IraqRep to FCO London, 29 December 2003, ‘Post-Conflict Iraq:
2003 Review’.
509
Telegram
337 IraqRep to FCO London, 1 January 2004, ‘Iraq: Six Final Months
of Occupation’.
510
Letter
Cannon to Adams, 4 December 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Video-Conference with
President Bush,
4 December’.
152