The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
102.
In its
response on 14 January 2002, the DIS concluded that the INC’s
weaknesses
far
outweighed its strengths and that it would have no chance of
overthrowing
103.
On 21 December
2001, in the context of discussions on the sustainability
of
US/UK joint
patrols to enforce the NFZs in Iraq, Mr Geoff Hoon, the Defence
Secretary,
asked MOD
officials for advice on options for future military action against
Iraq and their
“political,
legal and military implications” (see Section 6.1).75
104.
Dr Simon
Cholerton, a junior official in Overseas Secretariat (Sec(O)),
replied on
24 January
2002.76
He focused
on options for patrolling the NFZs, but also addressed
the issue
of wider action against Iraq. Dr Cholerton emphasised that neither
the MOD
nor the FCO
had seen any “detailed US planning”. Work on policy options, at
both
military
and political levels, was continuing in the US but “little, if
anything has been
shared with
the UK”. He advised that the “initial assessment of the efficacy
(never mind
the
legality) of military action to effect regime change is that it is
poor”.
105.
Dr Cholerton
explained that work commissioned by Mr Tebbit in December
2001
had
addressed the strengths and weaknesses of the INC. In the MOD’s
view:
“There is
no [Afghan] Northern Alliance equivalent in Iraq who could take
advantage
of
precision bombing – nor is it obvious that a successor regime would
be an
improvement
on the existing one. In the absence of any detailed US planning
…
it is very
difficult to comment further.”
106.
In January
and February 2002, the DIS in London and junior officials based
at
the British
Embassy Amman produced a number of reports on the state of
Iraq’s
politics,
economy and society.
107.
The DIS
reports painted a bleak picture of the state of Iraq’s
infrastructure
and
highlighted the degree of inter-connectedness between the Ba’ath
Party and
Iraq’s
armed forces and civil bureaucracy.
108.
The British
Embassy Amman reported that foreign diplomats based in
Baghdad
were agreed that, without massive external commitment on the
ground
or the
continuation of “the current system of order”, there was a risk
that regime
change
would destabilise Iraq.
109.
In mid-January
2002, the DIS reported on Iraq’s infrastructure.77
With the
exception
of road and
rail transport, the picture was comprehensively bleak. Services
had
been degraded
substantially in the Iran-Iraq war and the 1991 Gulf Conflict.
Repairs
74
Minute
PS/CDI to PS/PUS [MOD], 14 January 2002, ‘Iraq: Regime Change and
the Iraqi National
Congress’.
75
Minute
Williams to Sec(O)1, 21 December 2001, ‘Iraq’.
76
Minute
Cholerton to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 24 January 2002, ‘Iraq:
No Fly Zones’.
77
Paper DIS,
18 January 2002, ‘Infrastructure Briefing Memorandum:
Iraq’.
132