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6.1  |  Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq
890.  Mr Blair asked about the additional costs of Package 3 and whether they had been
discussed with the Treasury.
891.  The record of the meeting does not indicate whether Mr Blair’s question about
the cost of Package 3, and whether that had been discussed with the Treasury was
answered.
892.  Adm Boyce was reported to have said that “he believed that if we made a major
financial contribution through Package 3, we would be under less pressure to finance
a big share of the post‑conflict reconstruction effort”.
893.  Mr Rycroft recorded that Mr Blair concluded that the MOD should tell the US that
the UK was “prepared to put Package 3 on the same basis as Package 2 for planning
purposes, in order to keep the option open; but that no warning should be issued to the
Reservists at this stage”. Mr Blair “should be consulted again before any such warning
was issued”.
894.  Copies of the record of the meeting were sent to the Private Offices of Mr Hoon,
Mr Straw and Mr Brown, to Adm Boyce, and to Mr Bowen.
895.  The MOD discussions with the Treasury on the costs of the military options and
Mr Brown’s involvement are addressed in Section 13.
Why did the UK Government decide to offer ground forces?
896.  The decision to offer Package 3 was, as Sir David Manning advised Mr Blair,
a “political call”.
897.  In military terms, the US did not need UK ground forces to launch an
invasion of Iraq.
898.  Lord Boyce told the Inquiry that the US did not need a ground force contribution
from the UK:
“… if they had chosen to go on their own, they could have done so. They had the
capability and the numbers to do so.”348
899.  According to Sir David Manning, the military importance of the UK contribution
was:
“… quite an important contribution, but not decisive.
“The Americans could have done this operation without us. We always knew that …
But nevertheless, I’m sure they were grateful to have a sizeable British contribution
when, in the end, it came to military action.”349
348 Public hearing, 3 December 2009, page 37.
349 Public hearing, 30 November 2009, pages 38‑39.
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