The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

182.  As agreed on 19 December, Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei gave an informal update of

their assessment of the Iraqi declaration and the progress of inspection activities to the

members of the Security Council on 9 January (see Section 3.6).76 The points made by

Dr Blix included:

• His “overall impression” remained that Iraq’s declaration was “rich in volume

but poor in new information” and “practically devoid of new evidence on

such issues”.

• “… [T]o create confidence that it has no more weapons of mass destruction

or proscribed activities relating to such weapons, Iraq must present

credible evidence”.

• He had “not asserted … that proscribed items or activities” existed; but if they

did “Iraq should present them in our presence”. There was “still time” for that.

There was “no way the inspectors” could “close a file by simply invoking the

precept that Iraq cannot prove the negative”.

• There was a series of inconsistencies between the declaration and earlier Iraqi

declarations which had been described as full, final and complete, in addition to

the issues he had highlighted on 19 December, including in relation to special

munitions, imports of missile engines and solid missile fuel and VX.

UNMOVIC finds

• On 30 December, UNMOVIC inspectors found some Volga missile engines.77

• On 16 January, UNMOVIC discovered rocket warheads at an ammunition store.78

• On the same day UNMOVIC also discovered nuclear-related documents hidden at the

home of an Iraqi scientist.

Mr Blair’s interview on BBC’s Breakfast with Frost, 26 January 2003

183.  Mr Blair decided to use an interview on Breakfast with Frost on 26 January

to set out the position that the inspections should be given sufficient time to

determine whether or not Saddam Hussein was co-operating fully. If he was

not, that would be a sufficient reason for military action. A find of WMD was

not required.

184.  In a meeting with Sir Jeremy Greenstock and No.10 officials to discuss the

handling of Iraq in the UN Security Council in the coming weeks on 23 January, Mr Blair

set out an approach which included the need, “if we could possibly get it”, for “hard

76  UNMOVIC, Briefing the Security Council, 9 January 2003: Inspections in Iraq and a further assessment

of Iraq’s weapons declaration.

77  UN Security Council, ‘4707th Meeting Friday 14 February 2003’ (S/PV.4707).

78  Note DIS Counter Proliferation Support Group, 12 February 2003, ‘The Effectiveness of UN Weapons

Inspections in Iraq’.

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