9.1 |
March to 22 May 2003
131.
To avoid this
risk, Mr Straw suggested agreeing a Memorandum of
Understanding
(MOU) with
the US which would specify full consultation with the UK and
joint
decision-making
on policy decisions about ORHA’s activities. He attached a
draft.
Mr Straw
also observed that greater clarity about the role of the UN would
reduce
anxieties
about ORHA.
132.
Mr Straw’s
Private Secretary also sent Mr Rycroft a briefing for Mr Blair to
use at
the
Hillsborough meeting, written by the IPU.62
133.
The briefing
described the task for Hillsborough as:
“… to
expand the extent of US-UK agreement, particularly on the role of
the UN in
accompanying
and facilitating the political process leading to the establishment
of
an Iraqi
interim authority.”
134.
The best
outcome would be an agreed set of principles governing activity
in
post-conflict
Iraq.
135.
Concerns
remained about how the IIA would be established and
supervised
to ensure
it was supported by all sectors of Iraqi society. In particular,
the UK was
concerned
about US plans for “rushing ahead” with the appointment of the IIA
“with no
regard for
Iraqi buy-in”. The timing of the proposed Iraqi conference (12
April) was far too
soon; as
there would not be many “liberated Iraqi leaders from inside Iraq”,
Iraqi exiles
would be
bound to dominate.
136.
The IPU
suggested instead that an IIA should take immediate responsibility
for
“innocuous”
Iraqi Ministries, with the more complex ones added once its
capacity had
increased,
and the most sensitive once they were “well on the path of
reform”.
137.
The IPU
proposed that Mr Blair should raise the requirement for ORHA to
stay
within the
bounds of international law with President Bush, observing that US
and UK
lawyers
still did not have a shared interpretation of the powers of
Occupation.
138.
In a note for
Mr Blair covering the briefing for Hillsborough, Mr Rycroft
explained
that Dr
Rice would give a presentation on ORHA, and that the UK needed
clarity on
what the
organisation would actually do with each ministry.63
He observed
that ORHA
should
field “technical advisers, not shadow Ministers”.
139.
Mr Rycroft
highlighted agreeing a “partnership” with the UN as the key issue
for
the talks.
62
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 7 April 2003, ‘Hillsborough: Iraq’ attaching Briefing
IPU, 6 April 2003,
‘Iraq: Phase
IV: Authorising UNSCR’.
63
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 7 April 2003,
‘Hillsborough’.
153