3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
together
and the other objective was to ensure that if there was a material
breach
either
through non‑co-operation or through a find of WMD, then we didn’t
have to
go through
this whole rigmarole again and have another resolution that then
gave
a final,
final opportunity to comply.”325
924.
Mr Macleod
thought that there were two main objectives for the
resolution:
“One was to
achieve the disarmament of Iraq by essentially inspections
and
peaceful
means, if we could at all, and that’s why part of the focus of 1441
is on a
strong
inspection regime, but I think it was very much a part of the
framework, also,
that there
should be one final opportunity for Iraq to disarm and that that
should be
this
resolution, and that there would not be a further Security Council
decision at a
925.
In his private
hearing, Sir Jeremy Greenstock told the Inquiry that the
US:
“… wanted
freedom to be able to pin Iraq down in material breach, either
through
something
that was heinous in the declaration, or through a further act or
omission,
and they
wanted the capacity to report that to the Security Council without
it being
reported
through the inspectors.”327
“The French
knew what they were agreeing to, and then later didn’t want to
live
up to
what they had agreed to, and to that extent changed their policy
from the basis
of the
understanding of the negotiation in 1441.”328
“The French
wanted to make sure that the United States could not take
unilateral
action.
This was underlying the French position from beginning to
end.
“… the
French knew that they had not achieved in 1441 the requirement that
the
Security
Council make a decision following 1441, that 1441 was the last
point of
agreement
that we had reached, and that left the decision open by a Member
State,
devoid of a
Security Council resolution, to follow up on the previous
resolutions.”329
928.
In his first
statement for the Inquiry, Mr Straw wrote that the US had
“never”,
so far as
he was aware, “explicitly ruled out the possibility of a ‘second
resolution’”,
but their
“hard policy commitment was for one resolution only”: “An objective
of the
325
Private
hearing, 10 September 2010, page 61.
326
Public
hearing, 30 June 2010, page 10.
327
Private
hearing, 26 May 2010, pages 11‑12.
328
Private
hearing, 26 May 2010, pages 12‑13.
329
Private
hearing, 26 May 2010, pages 13‑14.
365