The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
804.
Sir David
commented that he thought some of those arguments were
“pretty
dubious”:
•
It was “not
clear” whether Saddam Hussein would be much affected by
signals
of British
military intent; “it was US intent that bothered him”.
•
The problem
of US expectations on Package 3 might have been
“self‑generated”.
His “guess” was that the UK military had “been pretty
forward
leaning in
their contacts with their US opposite numbers”.
•
He doubted
that the UK “would have much say in the management of
the
military
campaign”.
•
He was “not
much persuaded by the argument about US gratitude: it should
not
be a key
factor in our decision”.
•
He was “not
much persuaded either, that if we help with the
war‑fighting,
we shall be
spared the post‑conflict washing up. It didn’t work like that
in
Afghanistan.
Experience shows that once you are in, you’re in deep,
without
queues of
grateful countries waiting to take over when the shooting
stops.”
•
“Army
morale would have to be managed: we needn’t fight every
war.”
805.
Sir David
suggested that Mr Blair should explore with
Mr Hoon:
•
What had
changed since the summer when Mr Blair had been advised that
the
UK could
not deploy Package 3, and whether the new assumptions were
“really
safe and
robust”?
•
Whether the
UK could “bank on Turkish assurances given to the US
about
access,
bases and supply”?
•
Whether the
UK would be able to fight in a “CBW environment”, and “in
summer
temperatures
if necessary”?
•
Whether it
made sense to commit the UK so heavily to Iraq and how the
UK
would
respond to a sudden crisis elsewhere?
•
Whether
Package 3 was affordable?
806.
Sir David
concluded:
“In sum,
the MOD paper is special pleading for Package 3. You
[Mr Blair] may want
to go this
route to signal your determination; and for US solidarity reasons.
But there
are risks
and difficulties that need to be thoroughly explored; and there
will be costs
which are
only sketchily dealt with here – and which might
balloon.
“Personally,
I doubt whether there is a strong military case for Package 3. The
US
would like
us along, but could certainly do the job without UK land forces.
This is a
political
call.”
298