The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• Lt Gen Reith’s recommendations on the command and control structures for

potential operations in Iraq and preparations for Exercise Internal Look.

• There was a requirement to identify UK headquarters that might be required to

contribute to “follow on” operations.

746. The first paper that the MOD had been able to find on land options other than the

northern option was produced by Lt Gen Reith on 18 November. That is addressed later

in this Section.

747. Mr Drummond reported to Sir David Manning that the discussion at the Chiefs of

Staff meeting had addressed the:

“… importance of ‘force on mind’ as part of the campaign. The US was already using

this tactic to good effect. We were not yet, because no decisions have been taken

about the extent of our engagement in a possible military campaign. I said that the

attention was focused on getting the right UNSCR, which would be the priority for

the next few days.”303

748. Mr Drummond also reported that there was:

“A strong wish to do the northern Option 3. The military judgement was that this

should be tactically possible. Not to do it would damage our relations with the US

and might leave us with the even more onerous task of peacekeeping (Option 4).

I rehearsed the Prime Minister’s view that Option 2 would be a very substantial

contribution.”

749. There was “acceptance” that the US should lead on “persuading” Turkey, but a

wish that the UK would be able “to engage early” if the northern option was pursued.

There had been a “suggestion” that the US might be planning a northern option

without the UK; and that Turkey might find the presence of British troops “difficult

to contemplate”.

750. On the basis of their perception of the US timetable, the Chiefs of Staff

agreed on 9 October to seek a non‑public Ministerial decision in principle to offer

Package 3 to the US, ideally by 21 October.

751. The Chiefs of Staff recognised that UK withdrawal after Exercise Internal

Look would have unpalatable diplomatic consequences.

752. On 8 October, Brigadier William Rollo, a member of Maj Gen Fry’s staff, reported

to Adm Boyce’s Private Office that the US was likely to deploy its 4th Infantry Division

in the North, “irrespective of subsequent UK decisions”.304 He also reported signs of

Turkish nervousness.

303 Minute Drummond to Manning, 2 October 2002, ‘Chiefs Meeting’.

304 Minute Rollo to PSO/CDS, 8 October 2002, ‘Iraq Update on Warrior Planning’.

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