The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
In so far
as the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention allowed an
Occupying Power
to exercise
functions of government in occupied territory, Article 6 provided
that they
should
continue to have effect for as long as its military occupation
continued. Article 27
therefore
continued to apply throughout the Occupation of Iraq.
Ordinarily,
these provisions, including Article 78, cease to apply “one year
after the
general
close of military operations”. In the case of Iraq, the power to
intern individuals for
imperative
reasons of security was extended beyond the initial period of
Occupation, by
virtue of
UN resolution 1511 (2003) and by resolution 1546 (2004) and the
letters referred
to within
it, and then by resolutions 1637 (2005), 1723 (2006) and 1790
(2007).
Security
detainees were held as long as they continued to pose a threat to
security, in
accordance
with Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
908.
In an email to
Mr Casey on 14 June, Mr Asquith commented:
“… I do not
doubt the tactical benefit of engaging those in Anbar and other
Sunni
areas in
which AQ operate with the purpose of persuading them to turn
against
AQ. Nor do
I have any reason to doubt MNF‑I assessments that this
engagement
has
delivered significant results in terms of identifying AQ operatives
and caches,
restricting
AQ operating capabilities and reducing attacks … against coalition
forces.
Engaging
with local armed, militant, insurgency or opposition groups was of
course
what I and
others were engaged in throughout 2005. I am not opposed to
the
909.
Nevertheless,
Mr Asquith questioned whether these groups had turned
against
AQ for
wholly ideological reasons. He thought the groups were more
strongly motivated
either by a
power struggle with AQ, which was encroaching the tribes’
territory; or
money; or
by a desire – under the protection of US forces – to re‑arm and
prepare for
a future
campaign against Iran and/or the “Shia government”. Mr Asquith
considered
that
motivation had an adverse effect on the coalition’s broader
reconciliation strategy.
It
increased Prime Minister Maliki’s concerns and put him “under
severe pressure from
his Shia
constituency who pose the question: why is he tolerating the
creation of what
effectively
are Sunni militias who pose a threat (now or later) to Shia
communities, while
at the same
time tolerating regular coalition attacks on Shia
militias?”
“Given the
imperative for Petraeus to deliver something by 13 September …
we
can’t halt
the engagement process. We should instead seek to shape it in a
way
that reduces
the risk.”
496
Email
Asquith to Casey, 14 June 2007, ‘Anbar Engagement’.
170