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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
his suggestion that the UK should join the US/Iraqi negotiation group (the High Level
Working Group).
390.  On 15 September, the Sadrists withdrew from the UIA grouping in protest at
the Iraqi Government’s failure to meet their demands for an unbiased investigation
into the clashes between JAM and Badr forces during the holy pilgrimage to Karbala
in August.193
391.  Their action, together with the withdrawal of Fadhila in March, left the UIA (which
had originally held 128 of the 275 seats in the Council of Representatives) with only
81 seats. Attempts to join forces with the Sunni Islamic Party and to encourage Fadhila
to rejoin the Alliance had failed, leaving Prime Minister Maliki vulnerable to attempts from
others to oust him (former Prime Minister Ja’afari had been making moves to do so),
creating a wider destabilising effect on the Baghdad political scene.
392.  Mr Prentice commented:
“Our interest, and the higher Iraqi interest, remains the emergence of a competent,
inclusive administration able to command a majority in the CoR [Council of
Representatives] for its programme. Maliki is leaching parliamentary strength but is
far from finished … The better result would still be Hashemi and Tawafuq’s return to
government and the CoR’s endorsement of a Maliki-led Cabinet refreshed with new
technocrat recruits.”
393.  The leader of the Anbar “Awakening”, Sheikh Sittar, was murdered in mid-
September. AQ-I claimed responsibility.194 In his weekly report, Lt Gen Rollo described
Sheikh Sittar’s death as “most unwelcome news”, commenting that it was “too early to
tell how Sittar’s death will affect the security environment in Anbar – in the short term the
province has remained calm, with tribal leaders vowing to continue his work”.
394.  Lt Gen Rollo also reported that a feared spike of violence in Iraq around the time
of Ambassador Crocker and Gen Petraeus’ testimony to Congress, which was also the
week before Ramadan, had not materialised. Lt Gen Rollo contrasted the attack rate in
the week before Ramadan in 2006 (986 attacks, averaging 140 per day) with the figures
for 2007 (569, averaging 81 per day).
395.  On 16 September, Maj Gen Binns wrote to Lt Gen Houghton in relation to
negotiations with JAM1 to recommend that:
“Working to an agreed set of objectives, I seek the authority to negotiate and agree
the best deal I can get.”195
193  eGram 39173/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 24 September 2007, ‘Iraq: Political Manoeuvring’.
194  Minute Rollo to CDS, 16 September 2007, ‘SBMR-I Weekly Report (270) 16 Sep 07’.
195  Minute GOC MND(SE) to CJO, 16 September 2007, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION] Strategy’.
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