The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
his
suggestion that the UK should join the US/Iraqi negotiation group
(the High Level
Working
Group).
390.
On 15
September, the Sadrists withdrew from the UIA grouping in protest
at
the Iraqi
Government’s failure to meet their demands for an unbiased
investigation
into the
clashes between JAM and Badr forces during the holy pilgrimage to
Karbala
391.
Their action,
together with the withdrawal of Fadhila in March, left the UIA
(which
had
originally held 128 of the 275 seats in the Council of
Representatives) with only
81 seats.
Attempts to join forces with the Sunni Islamic Party and to
encourage Fadhila
to rejoin
the Alliance had failed, leaving Prime Minister Maliki vulnerable
to attempts from
others to
oust him (former Prime Minister Ja’afari had been making moves to
do so),
creating a
wider destabilising effect on the Baghdad political
scene.
392.
Mr Prentice
commented:
“Our
interest, and the higher Iraqi interest, remains the emergence of a
competent,
inclusive
administration able to command a majority in the CoR [Council
of
Representatives]
for its programme. Maliki is leaching parliamentary strength but
is
far from
finished … The better result would still be Hashemi and Tawafuq’s
return to
government
and the CoR’s endorsement of a Maliki-led Cabinet refreshed with
new
technocrat
recruits.”
393.
The leader of
the Anbar “Awakening”, Sheikh Sittar, was murdered in
mid-
September.
AQ-I claimed responsibility.194
In his
weekly report, Lt Gen Rollo described
Sheikh
Sittar’s death as “most unwelcome news”, commenting that it was
“too early to
tell how
Sittar’s death will affect the security environment in Anbar – in
the short term the
province
has remained calm, with tribal leaders vowing to continue his
work”.
394.
Lt Gen Rollo
also reported that a feared spike of violence in Iraq around the
time
of
Ambassador Crocker and Gen Petraeus’ testimony to Congress, which
was also the
week before
Ramadan, had not materialised. Lt Gen Rollo contrasted the attack
rate in
the week
before Ramadan in 2006 (986 attacks, averaging 140 per day) with
the figures
for 2007
(569, averaging 81 per day).
395.
On 16
September, Maj Gen Binns wrote to Lt Gen Houghton in relation
to
negotiations
with JAM1 to recommend that:
“Working to
an agreed set of objectives, I seek the authority to negotiate and
agree
the best
deal I can get.”195
193
eGram
39173/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 24 September 2007, ‘Iraq: Political
Manoeuvring’.
194
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 16 September 2007, ‘SBMR-I Weekly Report (270) 16 Sep
07’.
195
Minute GOC
MND(SE) to CJO, 16 September 2007, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION]
Strategy’.
258