6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
498.
The IPU listed
pros and cons of sectorisation:
“Pros
International
Profile (though this could be negative).
Ability to
make a real difference: exemplary administration of a sector,
setting the
standard
for others operating elsewhere.
Control:
less dependent on others (US in particular).
Cons
Exposure:
the former colonial power again administering Iraq. Possible
resentment,
even
resistance. Much would depend on the international
environment.
Expense.
Long-term commitment / military overstretch / drain on other
human
resources
(NHS staff, armed policemen).
We want a
united (albeit federal) Iraq. Lengthy occupation of sectors by [a]
different
power would
mean different systems of administration, and make a united Iraq
more
difficult
to achieve. (? Bosnia)”
499.
The IPU
offered a tentative conclusion, in which it square bracketed all
references
to the
possible duration of the UK’s responsibility for a sector. The IPU
stated that “in
any
foreseeable circumstances, the UK has the capacity to secure and
occupy for [six]
months” the
1,600 sq km initially envisaged, “though we think it is in fact
rather larger
than that”,
and to “take on a wide range of tasks”. The larger the sector, the
shorter the
time the UK
could administer it for. On that basis, the IPU
recommended:
“We need to
make clear to the US that we are
unwilling to take responsibility for
a sector
for more than [60 days] unless our presence is clearly and
expressly
authorised
by the UN, and there is to be an early move to a UN
transitional
administration. So we
can operate as ‘lead nation’ (ensuring security) within
a
UN
transitional administration, but are not willing to take on a
medium-term (two
year)
administration on our own, under a US occupation of Iraq which
lacks UN
authorisation.
We should tell the US that, were we to find ourselves in that
position,
we would
want to hand over to them [at the end of 60 days]. And they would
find it
extremely
difficult to find anyone to share the burden.”
500.
The record of
Mr Ricketts’ Iraq Evening Meeting on 18 February stated that
“a
possible UK
sector” had been one of the subjects discussed at post-conflict
talks with
the MOD
attended by Mr Ehrman and Mr Chilcott.212
212
Minute
Tanfield to PS/PUS [FCO], 18 February 2003, ‘Iraq Evening Meeting:
Key Points’.
397