6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
753.
Draft advice
to Mr Hoon was discussed at the Chiefs of Staff meeting
on
754.
The Chiefs of
Staff were informed that there seemed to be “increasing
flexibility”
in
Washington over the timing of military activity and that “the
weather would not be a
limiting
factor”. That might affect UK decision‑making.
755.
Ministers
“should be left in no doubt” that the northern option was a
“fundamental
part of US
planning”. From the Army’s “perspective, Package 3 would
guarantee
long‑term
strategic influence with the US”.
756.
Air Chief
Marshal Sir Peter Squire, Chief of the Air Staff, commented
that
Package 2
“did not entail a loss of influence”, and sought “visibility of
fallback options
in the South”.
757.
In the context
of predicted US discussions with Turkey on 21 October
and
reported
indications from US military contacts that planning for one
scenario whereby
the US
acted with the UK and another where it acted alone was “rapidly
becoming
untenable”,
the Chiefs of Staff considered that:
“Ministers
needed to be advised that a non‑public ‘decision in principle’ to
contribute
was
required, ideally by 21 October. In practice, because of the
unpalatable
diplomatic
consequences of the UK’s withdrawal after the completion of
Ex[ercise]
Internal
Look … 15 Oct[ober] was also a key date.”
758.
Lt Gen Reith
“observed that a meaningful discussion about, or leverage on,
US
planning
with Gen Franks would not be possible until a decision (in
principle) regarding
the UK
contribution had been made.”
759.
In addition,
to maintain the UK’s options, a call‑out of some Reserves by the
end
of October
might be required. That and visible action on UORs “would
contribute to the
‘force on
mind’ campaign”. A successful coercion strategy was “key to the
process”.
760.
The minutes
also record the view that “it would be important to guard against
the
perception
in the US that the UK’s decision was a matter of legitimacy as
opposed to a
problem
with mobilisation and public perception”.
761.
The Chiefs of
Staff directed that the advice to Mr Hoon should be amended
to
reflect the
discussion, including:
•
the timing
of US discussions with Turkey;
•
a “decision
in principle” on Package 3; and
•
more
explanation of the timelines for decision taking.
305
Minutes, 9
October 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
289