4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
“5. Finally
… we are pleased that the claim that Iraq used aflatoxin against
the Shia
uprising
has been excluded from the dossier but we are concerned that the
claim
in relation
to mustard remains as we consider the evidence to be
weak.”332
607.
Dr Jones sent
a copy of his minute to the office of Mr Cragg and others in
the
Defence
Intelligence Staff.
608.
The following
day, the chemical warfare expert in Dr Jones’ team wrote to
Dr Roper
setting out
in detail his concerns about aspects of the
dossier.333
609.
In relation to
the statement in the draft Foreword, that Mr Blair believed
that the
“assessed
intelligence has established beyond doubt” that “Saddam has
continued to
produce
chemical and biological weapons”, the minute stated:
“I
acknowledge that in this statement the Prime Minister will be
expressing his own
‘belief’
about what the assessed intelligence has established. What I wish
to record
is that
based on the intelligence available to me it has NOT established
beyond
doubt that
Saddam has continued to produce chemical [and biological]
weapons.”
610.
Addressing the
statement in the Foreword that “military planning allows for
some
of the WMD
to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them”, and a
“similar
statement”
in the dossier, the minute stated:
“This is
reported as a fact whereas the intelligence comes from a single
source.
In my view
the intelligence warrants no stronger a statement than ‘…
intelligence
suggest
that military planning allows …’”
611.
Addressing the
judgement in paragraph 6 of the Executive Summary, that Iraq
had
“continued
to produce chemical and biological agents”, the minute
stated:
“I have
seen intelligence that suggests that production of chemical agents
has
continued
but in my judgement this warrants no stronger statement than ‘Iraq
has …
probably
continued to
produce chemical [and biological] agents.’”
612.
Addressing the
judgement in paragraph 6 of the Executive Summary, that
“Some
of these
weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them”,
the
minute stated:
“It is not
clear what is meant … The judgement is too strong considering
the
intelligence
on which it is based.”
332
Minute
Jones to Roper, 19 September 2002, ‘Iraq Dossier’.
333
Minute [DIS
junior official] to DIST, 20 September 2002, ‘Iraq
Dossier’.
231