10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
and the
start of reconstruction. But the Iraqi population will blame the
Coalition if
progress is
slow.”
238.
Also on 16
April, General Tommy Franks, Commander in Chief US
Central
Command
(CENTCOM), issued his “Freedom Message to the Iraqi People”,
which
described
the role of the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA).142
Section 9.1
describes
how the
creation of the CPA signalled a major change in the US approach to
Iraq, from
a short
military Occupation to an extended civil administration, and
concludes that the
UK was slow
to recognise that change.
239.
The question
of whether the UK should take on general responsibility for
a
geographical
area of Iraq in the post-conflict period had been put to
Mr Blair’s
meeting on
post-conflict issues on 6 March 2003 (see Section
6.5).143
No
decision
had been
taken.
240.
On 16 April,
the AHMGIR, chaired in Mr Straw’s absence by
Mr Hoon,
commissioned
advice on whether the UK should lead one of ORHA’s regional
offices.144
241.
In response,
later that day, Mr Drummond sent Sir David Manning an IPU
paper
recommending
that the UK defer making a commitment to lead an ORHA
regional
office
until a scoping study had been carried out to determine the
practical implications
of such a
decision, including the costs.145
The IPU
paper was also sent to Mr Straw’s
Private
Office.
242.
The IPU paper
reported that the US had not yet decided on the number of
ORHA
regional
offices. One possibility was a four region structure consisting of
Baghdad,
northern
and eastern border provinces, central Iraq and southern
Iraq.
243.
The IPU stated
that the UK remained concerned that US policy in Iraq would not
be
consistent
with the UK’s understanding of the rights and responsibilities of
an Occupying
Power. If a
UK-led ORHA region included within it areas occupied by US forces,
the UK
would have
legal responsibility for their actions but no practical way to
control them.
244.
The IPU
advised that the UK therefore needed to decide whether in
principle
it wanted
to lead a regional office covering a region coterminous with that
in which
1 (UK)
Div was responsible for maintaining security. If Ministers wanted
to pursue that
option, a
number of fundamental questions needed urgent answers, including
how the
UK‑led regional
office would relate to UK forces.
142
Statement
Franks, 16 April 2003, ‘Freedom Message to the Iraqi
People’.
143
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Post-Conflict
Issues’.
144
Minutes, 16
April 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
145
Minute
Drummond to Manning, 16 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Support for ORHA
Regional Office’ attaching Paper
IPU, 16
April 2003, ‘Iraq: ORHA Regional Offices’.
47