8 | The
invasion
287.
Adm Boyce
informed the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 29 March that UK
forces
in the
South continued to consolidate their hold.171
288.
Mr Hoon
said it would be helpful if aid agencies and others could be
encouraged
to return
to the South to distribute aid. That would release troops from the
task.
289.
There is no
reference in the record of the meeting to any discussion of the
options
for
Basra.
290.
Just after
midday on 29 March, Sir David Manning spoke to Dr Rice, who told
him
that Gen
Franks was preparing for a major battle or “denouement” south of
Baghdad.172
She said
that Gen Franks would move when ready, probably within a few
days.
291.
Sir David and
Dr Rice discussed media comments in the US and UK that
the
campaign
was ill-prepared and had become “bogged down”. Sir David
said:
“It was
worth reminding people that we were only in week two of the war;
and that
we were
dealing with a population that had been traumatised by years of
repression
and where
people were in fear of their lives. When we took control of urban
centres,
and it
became clear that Saddam was really finished, people would be more
likely
to lose
their fear and speak out about Saddam and the horrors they had
endured.”
292.
The Red Team
produced another report on 29 March, again intended to
“provoke
thought
rather than to provide authoritative assessment”, which analysed
Saddam
Hussein’s
likely survival strategy.173
It
stated:
“We need a
focus for our information operations … the best focus would be
Basra
under
Coalition control, with an effective humanitarian operation in
train and plenty
of
exploitation of recent atrocities. This would have a real impact on
his level of
international
support. This is so critical that the relief of Basra should become
the
Coalition
main effort.”
293.
The Chiefs of
Staff meeting on 30 March was informed that an attack
had
been conducted
by 1 (UK) Div on the Iraqi Intelligence HQ in Basra overnight
on
29/30 March.174
7 Armoured
Brigade had conducted raids on “opportunity targets”
in
Basra,
“taking advantage of a growing perception that the city was
‘opening up’ to the
Coalition”.
Radio broadcasts were being transmitted into Basra. Local militia
patrols
had “significantly
reduced”.
294.
In a minute
taking stock of the position for Mr Blair, Sir David
Manning
suggested a
review of strategy, including consideration of putting plans
for
Baghdad on
hold and focusing on Basra.
171
Minutes, 29
March 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
172
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 29 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi
Rice’.
173
Minute MOD
[junior official] to PS/CDI, 28 March 2003, ‘Iraq Red Team –
Saddam’s Survival Strategy’.
174
Minutes, 30
March 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
49