The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
members of
the assembly that would draft the new Iraqi
Constitution.57
The fatwa
said
that the
CPA plan was “unacceptable from the outset”, and that in its
place:
“First of
all there must be a general election so that every Iraqi citizen –
who
is eligible
to vote – can choose someone to represent him in a
foundational
Constitution
prepration assembly. Then the drafted Constitution can be
put
to a
referendum.”
153.
Grand
Ayatollah al-Sistani concluded his fatwa:
“All
believers must insist on the accomplishement of this crucial matter
and
contribute
and contribute to achieving it in the best way
possible.”
Grand
Ayatollah al-Sistani is Iraq’s senior Shia
theologian.58
Born in
Iran, al-Sistani is considered to be the most senior of the four
Grand Ayatollahs
based in
Najaf, although that position is not a formal one.59
All four
advocate the principle
of a clear
separation between religion and politics, in contrast to Grand
Ayatollah Khomeni
in Iran.
They exercise their influence through a network of clerics and
mosques, and
through
Shia political parties, in particular the Supreme Council for an
Islamic Revolution
in Iraq
(SCIRI) and Dawa.
As
religious leader of around 60 percent of the Iraqi population,
al-Sistani has a very
154.
Sir David
Manning raised concerns about the US lack of consultation with the
UK
with Dr
Rice on 27 June.61
Dr Rice
indicated that she had heard about the problems,
and had
“taken these on board”.
155.
In a meeting
with Mr Hoon on the same day, Dr Rice raised a US concern
that
the
drawdown of UK forces in southern Iraq meant a lessening of UK
commitment to
156.
Mr Hoon
replied that force levels were based on an assessment of the
security
situation.
In the South “a heavy hand might be a destabilising factor” but
more troops
were
available “if the situation demanded”. It was important that
“significant funds” for
reconstruction
flowed into the area if a successful outcome was to be
achieved.
57
Talmon
S. The
Occupation of Iraq: Volume II The Official Documents of the
Coalition Provisional
Authority and
the Iraqi Governing Council. Hart
Publishing, 2013.
58
Minute Owen
to Rycroft, 13 January 2004, ‘Iraq: Sistani’.
59
Telegram 50
Baghdad to FCO London, 21 January 2005, ‘Iraq: Key Political
Players: Shia: Part One
of Two’.
60
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 13 January 2004, ‘Iraq:
Sistani’.
61
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 27 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Meeting with Condi Rice,
27 June’.
62
Letter
Williams to McDonald, 27 June 2003, ‘Defence Secretary’s meeting
with Condi Rice –
27 June
2003’.
230