3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
176.
Cabinet was
also informed that the Oil‑for‑Food resolution had been rolled over
for
only nine
days because of difficulties with the United States on the Goods
Review List.
177.
Cabinet did
not discuss the issues.
178.
A FCO report
on Saddam Hussein’s crimes and humanitarian abuses, which
was
published
on 2 December, is addressed in Section 6.4.
179.
Resolution
1441 (OP3) required Iraq to provide:
“… not
later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently
accurate, full
and
complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop
chemical,
biological,
and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and other delivery
systems
such as
unmanned vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on
aircraft,
including
any holdings and the precise locations of such weapons,
components,
sub‑components,
stocks of agents, and related material and equipment,
the
locations
and work of its research development and production facilities, as
well as
all other
chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including for any
which it
claims are
for purposes not related to weapons production or
material.”56
180.
The inclusion
of a mandatory requirement for an immediate declaration of
Iraq’s
WMD
holdings by a defined date had been the subject of much discussion
during the
negotiation
of resolution 1441 (see Section 3.5).
181.
Mr Straw
had originally warned that it would provide Iraq with opportunities
for
obfuscation,
leading to endless arguments within the Council.57
182.
In a
conversation with Secretary Powell on 16 September, Mr Straw
had suggested
that a
full, final and complete declaration could only be done once the
inspectors were in
183.
The JIC
Assessment of 14 November stated that Iraq would “try to
overload
UNMOVIC by
releasing large volumes of information”; and that it would “seek to
take
advantage
of any opportunity to fudge” its obligations.59
184.
On 20
November, in response to a remit from COBR(R) (see Section 2),
Mr Gray
provided a
note, agreed within the FCO and with DIS about how to handle Iraq’s
likely
efforts to
flood UNMOVIC with masses of detail as an obfuscatory
tactic.60
56
UN Security
Council resolution 1441 (2002).
57
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 14 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Pursuing the UN
Route’.
58
Telegram
1729 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 16 September 2002, ‘Iraq:
Foreign Secretary’s
Conversation
with US Secretary of State, 16 September’.
59
JIC
Assessment, 14 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Regime Cohesion Under
Pressure’.
60
Letter Gray
to Bowen, 20 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Obfuscation under UNSCR
1441’.
35