The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
106.
Lieutenant
General John Reith, Chief of Joint Operations (CJO), proposed
the
creation of
a Common Document to “capture the UK’s position across the range
of
Phase IV
issues” in a paper for the Chiefs of Staff on 27
January.58
107.
Lt Gen Reith
stated that US planning had developed rapidly. It was based on
a
single
unified plan for Iraq with which Coalition partners would be
expected to comply.
The US
distinction between humanitarian assistance and post-conflict
reconstruction
remained.
USAID/CENTCOM plans for the former were “relatively well advanced”,
with
the
“Humanitarian Assistance Plan” already endorsed by President Bush.
Reconstruction
options
were “well-formed on paper”, but waiting on key strategic
decisions.
108.
Lt Gen Reith
argued that the UK needed immediate engagement, at the
right
levels,
with a consistent message, if it was to influence US plans. He
proposed a
document,
with DFID and FCO buy-in, that would mirror the terminology used
in
US planning
and set out UK aspirations and potential involvement against each
of
the current
US planning objectives. Without it, it would be “difficult to
deliver to our
embedded
liaison staffs the necessary guidance that they require to shape
early US
thinking,
or to ensure that UK policy guidance is met”. That was needed as
soon as
possible.
109.
Lt Gen Reith
proposed a two day planning seminar the following week. It
would
need to be
more than a “talking shop”. Its aim should be to deliver “an
authoritative
account of
‘UK policy’”, to be validated by senior staff from across
government before
being put
to Ministers.
110.
The Chiefs of
Staff discussed the proposal at their meeting on 29 January.
They
concluded
that “the Phase IV Common Document … would establish a
framework
UK policy,
which would … provide guidance to the embedded UK staffs charged
with
influencing
US thinking”.59
111.
The PJHQ Phase
IV planning seminar took place on 5 February and is
described
later in
this Section.
112.
Meetings in
late 2002 and early 2003 revealed a strong convergence
between
senior UK
and French officials’ views on post-conflict issues.
113.
French
officials warned that the UK should not let optimistic scenarios
blind
it to
potential problems, including political
disintegration.
114.
France
would want to play a role in post-conflict Iraq, but would not
want
to “dive
into a quagmire”.
58
Minute
Reith to COSSEC, 27 January 2003, ‘Op Telic: UK Approach to Phase
IV Planning’.
59
Minutes, 29
January 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
330