The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

the meeting, Mr Blair warned that, even if Saddam Hussein were overthrown relatively

quickly, the big issue would remain of what followed his departure in a country that

had never known democracy. There would be an enormous amount of work needed to

get post-Saddam Hussein Iraq right, even if US troops were to remain in Iraq for up to

18 months after any conflict.

454. A plenary meeting between President Bush and Mr Blair and their teams followed

the restricted discussion.245 During the plenary meeting, Mr Hadley put forward three

principles for post-Saddam Hussein Iraq: territorial integrity, democracy and a role

for the UN.

455. Detailed consideration of the options for UK force contributions in Iraq

began in September 2002.

456. Military planners advised that, in the event of the deployment of UK land

forces, there was a judgement to be made on whether the UK military should be

engaged in the conflict or post-conflict phase. Both would be difficult to sustain.

457. Adm Boyce described it as “inconceivable” that the UK military would not

contribute “in some manner” to post-conflict tasks.

458. On 9 September, the MOD prepared advice for the meeting between Mr Hoon

and Secretary Rumsfeld on 11 September, including some high level questions on

post‑conflict planning:

• “How does the military plan work” after regime change?

• What role would the US and others have in reconstruction?

• How long would military engagement last?246

459. There is no indication that those issues were raised during Mr Hoon’s visit

to Washington.247

460. On 19 September, the Chiefs of Staff discussed a commentary on options for

UK force contributions in Iraq prepared by the SPG.248

461. The SPG paper presented four options for a UK military contribution and

highlighted a number of continuing strategic uncertainties: the shape of the campaign,

its timing, post-conflict commitments and the legal basis for military action.249

245 Letter Rycroft to Sedwill, 8 September 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with Bush, Camp David,

7 September: Public Presentation of Iraq Policy’.

246 Minute Cholerton to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 9 September 2002, ‘Iraq – Defence Secretary’s

Meeting with Rumsfeld’.

247 Telegram 1159 Washington to FCO London, 11 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Mr Hoon’s Visit to Washington,

11 September’.

248 Minutes, 19 September 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

249 Paper SPG, 19 September 2002, ‘Iraq Package Options – Military Strategic Commentary at

19 September 2002’.

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