3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
especially,
if things went wrong. In such circumstances the US would need
the
international
community at the scene of the crime … A solo US effort that
ended
in failure
would give those who saw the EU as an alternative power to the US
the
chance they
had been waiting for.
“If the US
answer to a coalition was ‘yes’, then UN involvement was
essential.
The Prime
Minister’s letter [the Note of 28 July] had been a little ambiguous
on
who should
issue the ultimatum; yesterday he [Mr Blair] had been clear
that the
ultimatum
should issue from the UN. He wanted a hard‑edged ultimatum with a
clear
link to
military action – but recognised that achieving such a text would
be difficult. If
Saddam …
accepted inspectors on our terms, the Prime Minister thought that
would
end the
case for military action for the time being. But he thought Saddam
unlikely
to give
in.”
108.
Mr Straw
said that he had a slightly different opinion: “Saddam was a busker
and
survivor”.
Mr Straw added that: “it would be harder to make the case for
military action
if he
[Saddam Hussein] had been disarmed – and, eventually, Saddam would
go”.
109.
Mr Straw
told Secretary Powell that Mr Blair’s view was that building a
coalition
“meant
working through the UN”; and that in the Middle East it meant doing
something
on the
Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). Mr Blair would be “willing
to spend time and
political
capital” on the latter “including holding a peace conference”.
Secretary Powell
responded
that although he had been the principal advocate of a conference,
there were
not “enough
elements to get it together”.
110.
Addressing the
“public case”, Mr Straw said that the UK dossier:
“… needed a
compelling last chapter. We could make a better case than the
one
we had made
so far. Traditional Cold War‑style containment did not work for
WMD.
Rogue
states did not have as much at stake as the Soviet
bloc.”
111.
Mr Straw
said that he had told Mr Blair about Secretary Powell’s “more
sceptical
view of
Russia’s likely support” but Mr Blair “was convinced that
securing Russia
depended on
the price”.
112.
Mr Straw
asked whether military action would work. Secretary Powell
explained
that US
thinking had developed since the end of July; the “standing start”
needed
an Iraqi
trigger, so the US enthusiasm for it had waned. The focus was now
on the
“generated
case”.
113.
Mr Straw
told Secretary Powell that “if there were action tomorrow the
Prime
Minister
would be in difficulties”. It was “not just the usual suspects
causing trouble”;
respected
retired officials were “publicly raising doubts” and the “lawyers
were saying in
terms that
there were not sufficient grounds … to support regime change”. On
“military
action more
generally” the lawyers “had not definitively opined but had said it
would be
easier if
there were an SCR”. Mr Straw drew Secretary Powell’s attention
to the passage
113