The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
377.
The CIG judged
that it was unclear how the Special Groups would respond
to
the recent
“freeze” on JAM activity by Muqtada al-Sadr, but doubted that it
would affect
Iran’s
influence.
378.
The Assessment
Note continued:
“… we judge
that IRGC QF
control over these special groups is far from total.
The special
groups are using Iranian weaponry to target Shia rivals against
Iranian
wishes …
And … there is increasing division between leaders of some of the
special
groups.
“In many
areas the distinction between special groups and more militant
elements of
mainstream
JAM is becoming increasingly blurred as Muqtada al-Sadr’s control
of
the latter
ebbs, leaving them more open to Iranian influence …”
379.
On 13
September, President Bush made a speech on Iraq.187
Describing
the
challenge
there as “formidable”, he nonetheless pointed to the successes of
the surge in
Baghdad and
Anbar. He said:
“Because of
this success, General Petraeus believes we have now
reached
the point
where we can maintain our gains with fewer American forces. He
has
recommended
that we not replace about 2,200 Marines scheduled to leave
Anbar
province
later this month. In addition, he says it will be possible to bring
home an
Army combat
brigade, for a total force reduction of 5,700 troops by
Christmas.
And he
expects that by July, we will be able to reduce our troop levels in
Iraq from
20 combat
brigades to 15.”
380.
Having
consulted with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other members of his
national
security
team, Iraqi officials and leaders of both parties in Congress,
President Bush
announced
that he had accepted Gen Petraeus’ recommendations. President
Bush
directed
that Gen Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker report again to Congress
in
March 2008
with “a fresh assessment of the situation in Iraq and of the troop
levels and
resources
we need to meet our national security objectives”.
381.
Mr Prentice
reported to the FCO on 13 September that it looked likely
agreement
would be
reached to renew resolution 1723, on the understanding that it
would be the
last time
and that a new bilateral US/Iraq security arrangement would be put
in place by
382.
Mr Prentice
commented that there was a new US team in Baghdad, which had
no
corporate
experience of the negotiations that led to resolution 1723. Those
officials had
told him
that their interpretation was that a long-term partnership should
include coalition
partners.
Mr Prentice had explained to them why moving to a security
relationship
187
Speech
Bush, 13 September 2007, ‘Speech – President Bush on
Iraq’.
188
eGram
37790/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 13 September 2007, ‘Iraq: UNSCR –
US Activity Behind
the
Scenes’.
256