3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
real Iraqis
… decide to offer resistance. Suppose … that any difficulties,
without a
coalition,
are magnified and seized on by a hostile international opinion. If
we win
quickly,
everyone will be our friend. If we don’t … recriminations will
start fast.
“None of
these things might happen. But they might … And there is one other
point.
We will
need to commit to Iraq for the long term. Bedding down a new regime
will
take time.
So, without support, the possibility of unintended consequences
will
persist
through and beyond the military phase.”
419.
Mr Blair
stated that he was “keen on a coalition, not necessarily military
but
politically”.
420.
Addressing the
nature of a coalition, Mr Blair wrote that he was “a little
alarmed”
about the
reports he had been given of US optimism about support from Arab
nations
and Europe.
That was not his reading, and:
“The
trouble is, everyone says: they will support action, but they add a
rider …
[which] is
not always sufficiently heard or spoken.”
421.
Mr Blair
identified three key areas where, in his view, changes would be
needed
before
there would be support for action on Iraq:
•
the Middle
East Peace Process would need to be in a different
place;
•
specific UN
authority; and
•
public
opinion in the UK, Europe and the Arab world was “quite simply
on
a different
planet” from opinion in the US.
422.
Mr Blair added
that “right now”, he “couldn’t be sure of support from
Parliament,
Party,
public or even some of the Cabinet”; and that, “oddly”, Russia
might be their
“best ally”.
423.
Mr Blair set
out six elements for “A Strategy for Achieving a
Coalition”.
424.
Addressing
“The
UN”, Mr Blair
wrote:
“We don’t
want to be mucked around by Saddam … and the danger is he drags
us
into
negotiation. But we need, as with Afghanistan and the ultimatum to
the Taliban,
to
encapsulate our casus belli in some defining way. This is certainly
the simplest.
We could,
in October as the build up starts, state that he must let the
inspectors
back in
unconditionally and do so now, ie set a 7-day deadline. It might be
backed by
a UNSCR or
not, depending on what support there was (and I am not sure
anyone,
at present,
would veto it if Russia was on board). There would be no
negotiation.
There would
be no new talks with Annan. It would be: take it or leave
it.”
425.
Mr Blair added
that he knew there would be “reluctance” to that
approach:
“But it
would neutralise opposition … If he did say yes, we continue the
build-up and
we send
teams over and the moment he obstructs, we say: he’s back to his
games.
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