The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Between
June 2006 and March 2007, officials in Basra produced three “Better
Basra
Plans”,
which aimed to get Basra on track for the transfer to Provincial
Iraqi Control (PIC).
The first,
produced under the direction of Mr Des Browne, the Defence
Secretary, focused
on Security
Sector Reform. The third was a comprehensive plan, produced by the
British
Embassy
Office Basra, MND(SE) and the PRT, setting out nine lines of
operation including
reconstruction
under an “over‑arching political strategy”.
The
Stabilisation Unit subsequently reported that the “Better Basra
Plans” had gone some
way to make
up for the absence of a UK strategy for Iraq, but had been
undermined by a
lack of
strategic guidance from Whitehall and frequent changeover of
personnel in theatre,
and so
“eventually fell by the wayside during the course of
2007”.30
92.
The security
situation in Basra continued to deteriorate. In October 2006,
the
majority of
civilian staff were withdrawn from the Basra Palace Compound to
Basra
Air Station
(BAS), where MND(SE) was already based. The lack of
hardened
accommodation
at BAS meant that the PRT withdrew first to Kuwait and
redeployed
to BAS
in February 2007.
93.
Mr Gordon
Brown took office as Prime Minister at the end of June 2007. In
relation
to Iraq, he
focused his attention on initiatives to support economic growth and
private
sector
investment in Basra. DFID increased staffing in both Basra and
Baghdad to
support
those economic initiatives.
94.
The UK‑led PRT
in Basra continued to be the primary means of delivering the
UK’s
reconstruction
effort in the South.
95.
In March 2008,
Prime Minister Maliki launched a major offensive against
militia
groups in
Basra, known as the “Charge of the Knights”. The operation led to
an
immediate
improvement in the security situation in Basra. The US and the
Iraqi
Government
moved quickly to exploit it by pouring in resources for
reconstruction and
in particular
for projects which would have an immediate, visible
impact.
96.
A junior DFID
official reported from Basra that it seemed the US could “do
things”
that the UK
had not tried.31
It was able
to dedicate more people and more money to the
task;
change the security environment to secure better civilian access;
operate outside
Iraqi
structures; ensure better linkages to US work in Baghdad; and
“apply sufficient
clout at
the Baghdad end” to secure the Iraqi Government’s
attention.
30
Report
Stabilisation Unit, 3 September 2008, ‘Review of the Basra
Provincial Reconstruction Team’.
31
Email DFID
[junior official] to DFID [junior official], 9 April 2008,
‘Basra’.
542