Executive Summary

799. The following key findings are from Section 3.1:

• After the attacks on the US on 9/11, Mr Blair declared that the UK would

stand “shoulder to shoulder” with the US to defeat and eradicate international

terrorism.

• Mr Blair took an active and leading role throughout the autumn of 2001 in

building a coalition to act against that threat, including taking military action

against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

• Mr Blair also emphasised the potential risk of terrorists acquiring and using

a nuclear, biological or chemical weapon, and the dangers of inaction.

• In relation to Iraq, Mr Blair sought to influence US policy and prevent precipitate

military action by the US, which he considered would undermine the success

of the coalition which had been established for action against international

terrorism. He recommended identifying an alternative policy which would

command widespread international support.

• In December 2001, Mr Blair suggested a strategy for regime change in Iraq

that would build over time, including “if necessary” taking military action without

losing international support.

• The tactics chosen by Mr Blair were to emphasise the threat which Iraq might

pose, rather than a more balanced consideration of both Iraq’s capabilities and

intent; and to offer the UK’s support for President Bush in an effort to influence

his decisions on how to proceed.

• That remained Mr Blair’s approach in the months that followed.

800. The following key findings are from Section 3.2:

• The UK continued to pursue implementation of the “smarter” economic sanctions

regime in the first months of 2002, but continuing divisions between Permanent

Members of the Security Council meant there was no agreement on the way

forward.

• In public statements at the end of February and in the first week of March 2002,

Mr Blair and Mr Straw set out the view that Iraq was a threat which had to be

dealt with.

• At Cabinet on 7 March, Mr Blair and Mr Straw emphasised that no decisions

had been taken and Cabinet was not being asked to take decisions. Cabinet

endorsed the conclusion that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

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