6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
way of
stopping a terrible bloodletting of revenge after Saddam goes.
Traditional in
549.
On 28
September, the British Embassy Washington updated London on
initial
US thinking
on the post-conflict administration of Iraq.293
The latest
NSC view was
that an
initial military governorate should be succeeded by a civilian
administration,
with the
gradual draw down of the military presence ahead of the transfer of
authority
to an Iraqi
government. The size of the military footprint, economic
governance,
oil and
humanitarian and reconstruction needs were among issues yet to
be
properly addressed.
550.
Sir David
Manning drew on the comments from Mr Powell and the
Washington
Embassy in
his response to the FCO paper on scenarios for the future of Iraq
on
29
September.294
He asked
for more detailed advice on which were the most
plausible
of the possible models for a post-Saddam Hussein administration.
With the
US reported
to be proposing a military governorate, the most immediate question
was
where the
UN would fit in. In particular, what scope was there for preparing
the blueprint
for a UN
administration-in-waiting drawing on currently exiled technocrats.
Being very
careful not
to draw false analogies with Afghanistan, should a UN
administration set
out an
early timetable promising democratic consultation on the Loya Jirga
model,
or would
this risk chaos?
551.
The MOD
raised with the FCO the need to consider how
assumptions
about the
UK’s post-conflict role might inform decisions on the UK’s
military
contribution
to conflict.
552.
Sir
Christopher Meyer highlighted the need to keep sight of the
UK’s
post-conflict
commercial interests.
553.
DFID
commented on the importance of learning from DFID and
inter-
departmental
experience elsewhere.
554.
On 30
September, Mr Lee instructed Mr David Johnson, Head of the MOD
Iraq
Secretariat,
to send the MOD’s views to the FCO. He suggested that the FCO
paper
should
include more detail on de-Ba’athification, how an international
security force
might be
put together and how large it would need to be. Mr Lee also
requested the
inclusion
of questions and assumptions that would make clear “the speculative
nature
of the
current state of thinking”. Those might include: whether the UN
Security Council
would
supervise reconstruction if the US acted unilaterally; the role of
neighbours,
Russia,
France and international bodies other than the UN; and whether it
was possible
to
“determine criteria for UK military involvement”.295
292
Manuscript
comment Powell to Manning on Letter McDonald to Manning, 26
September 2002,
‘Scenarios
for the future of Iraq after Saddam’.
293
Telegram
1251 Washington to FCO London, 28 September 2002,
‘US/Iraq’.
294
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 29 September 2002, ‘Scenarios for the future
of Iraq after Saddam’.
295
Minute Lee
to Head of Sec(Iraq), 30 September 2002, ‘Scenarios for the Future
of Iraq after Saddam’.
205