9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
208.
On 19
September, after a discussion with senior Whitehall officials and
Mr Patey in
Baghdad,
Sir Nigel Sheinwald produced detailed advice for Mr Blair on
UK Iraq strategy
and
priorities for the next three to six months.109
209.
Sir Nigel
identified an “underlying conflict” between the objective defined
for the
Red Team
and the coalition’s current objective to:
“… hold to
the political timetable (Constitution, referendum, elections in
2005) and
build up
Iraqi capabilities so that the coalition can begin a progressive
withdrawal,
starting
next year.
“This
involves a concept of ‘sufficiency’, i.e. we accept that the
insurgency will go on
for some
time, but aim to contain it sufficiently for the political and
security transition
to be
credible and for us to be able to draw down without appearing to
cut and
run dishonourably.”
210.
Sir Nigel
commented that the coalition’s current strategy recognised that in
order to
win over
Sunni opinion, it would be necessary to show that the coalition
would honour its
commitment
to withdraw and not occupy Iraq indefinitely.
211.
In contrast,
the Red Team’s approach implied additional US resources, which
the
US
Administration might not be willing to provide, and no withdrawal
for at least three
years. It
would also require “a massive Iraqi co-ordination effort, of which
they are at
present
incapable”.
212.
Sir Nigel
observed that the “ink-spot” approach recommended by the Red
Team
was similar
to the coalition’s current concept of operations in Fallujah,
Samarra and
other
areas. To date there had been “no
success
stories in Sunni areas” and it was “not
obvious how
this would change quickly”. He continued:
“Arguably,
this strategy comes two and a half years late. It might have been
possible
to try
something like this immediately after the invasion, but to do so
now, fifteen
months
after the Occupation formally ended, and with the definitive
government
about to be
elected, is – to put it mildly – counter-intuitive.”
213.
Sir Nigel
wrote that the Red Team Report was nevertheless to be
welcomed
because:
“•
It is
realistic in its assessment, and comprehensive in its
scope;
•
It insists
on an integrated campaign (security, political,
economic);
•
It
specifies actions that need to be taken, and demands active
follow-through.”
214.
On political
priorities, Sir Nigel considered that the UK was facing two phases
of
activity.
Until the end of 2005, “the bottom line requirement is to keep the
show on the
road, ie
provide an environment in which the referendum and elections can
take place”.
109
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 19 September 2005, ‘Iraq: UK
strategy’.
523