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9.4  |  June 2005 to May 2006
208.  On 19 September, after a discussion with senior Whitehall officials and Mr Patey in
Baghdad, Sir Nigel Sheinwald produced detailed advice for Mr Blair on UK Iraq strategy
and priorities for the next three to six months.109
209.  Sir Nigel identified an “underlying conflict” between the objective defined for the
Red Team and the coalition’s current objective to:
“… hold to the political timetable (Constitution, referendum, elections in 2005) and
build up Iraqi capabilities so that the coalition can begin a progressive withdrawal,
starting next year.
“This involves a concept of ‘sufficiency’, i.e. we accept that the insurgency will go on
for some time, but aim to contain it sufficiently for the political and security transition
to be credible and for us to be able to draw down without appearing to cut and
run dishonourably.”
210.  Sir Nigel commented that the coalition’s current strategy recognised that in order to
win over Sunni opinion, it would be necessary to show that the coalition would honour its
commitment to withdraw and not occupy Iraq indefinitely.
211.  In contrast, the Red Team’s approach implied additional US resources, which the
US Administration might not be willing to provide, and no withdrawal for at least three
years. It would also require “a massive Iraqi co-ordination effort, of which they are at
present incapable”.
212.  Sir Nigel observed that the “ink-spot” approach recommended by the Red Team
was similar to the coalition’s current concept of operations in Fallujah, Samarra and
other areas. To date there had been “no success stories in Sunni areas” and it was “not
obvious how this would change quickly”. He continued:
“Arguably, this strategy comes two and a half years late. It might have been possible
to try something like this immediately after the invasion, but to do so now, fifteen
months after the Occupation formally ended, and with the definitive government
about to be elected, is – to put it mildly – counter-intuitive.”
213.  Sir Nigel wrote that the Red Team Report was nevertheless to be welcomed
because:
It is realistic in its assessment, and comprehensive in its scope;
It insists on an integrated campaign (security, political, economic);
It specifies actions that need to be taken, and demands active follow-through.”
214.  On political priorities, Sir Nigel considered that the UK was facing two phases of
activity. Until the end of 2005, “the bottom line requirement is to keep the show on the
road, ie provide an environment in which the referendum and elections can take place”.
109  Minute Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 19 September 2005, ‘Iraq: UK strategy’.
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