Previous page | Contents | Next page
3.5  |  Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002 –
the negotiation of resolution 1441
833.  Mr Putin proposed a joint EOV by the P5. Mr Blair was prepared to agree that,
provided that the undertaking to consult was tied to an undertaking to act.
834.  Following a series of discussions in New York on 7 November, which focused
on Security Council unity and the need for a balance between safeguards on Council
involvement, a clear warning of the consequences of non‑compliance and the powers
needed by the inspectors to secure the objective of Iraq’s disarmament, the US and UK
agreed the final changes to the draft resolution.282
835.  Sir Jeremy Greenstock reported that Mr Lavrov had sought an addition to OP4
providing for a material breach to be “reported [to] and assessed by the Council”, and
had also expressed concern that the “US wanted the whole Council to accept some
unpredictable future event would constitute a material breach”.
836.  Sir Jeremy Greenstock subsequently stated that the purpose of the resolution was:
“(i) to clarify and strengthen the inspections regime so that the disarmament of Iraq’s
WMD, in accordance with its obligations … could be brought to full and verified
completion through this enhanced inspections regime; and (ii) to deliver the clear‑cut
warning, one final time, that failure to comply with its disarmament obligations would,
in accordance with this resolution, including the procedures specified in OPs 4,
11 and 12, mean that Iraq will face serious consequences.”
837.  The US and UK also made clear that the resolution provided for a two stage
process with the Council at its centre.
838.  Following discussion with Washington and agreement with the UK, the US
delegation introduced a revised text. The decision that a further material breach would
be “reported to the Council in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12”, not “11 or 12”,
in OP4 was described as a “substantial change”. At the request of Russia, “secure”
replaced “restore” in OP12.
839.  Mr Lavrov had also asked the US and UK for confirmation that the “failures”
referred to in OP4 related to WMD programmes, and to clarify whether they understood
OP4 to require a report by UNMOVIC and the IAEA to the Security Council and then
Council discussion.
840.  On the last point, Sir Jeremy had responded that:
“If there was a further Iraqi breach … the matter would return to the Council for
discussion as required under OP12. We would then expect the Security Council
to meet its responsibilities.”
841.  Resolution 1441 was adopted on 8 November by a unanimous vote of the
members of the Security Council.
282 Telegram 2128 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 8 November 2002, ‘Iraq Resolution: 7 November’.
343
Previous page | Contents | Next page