3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
833.
Mr Putin
proposed a joint EOV by the P5. Mr Blair was prepared to agree
that,
provided
that the undertaking to consult was tied to an undertaking to
act.
834.
Following a
series of discussions in New York on 7 November, which
focused
on Security
Council unity and the need for a balance between safeguards on
Council
involvement,
a clear warning of the consequences of non‑compliance and the
powers
needed by
the inspectors to secure the objective of Iraq’s disarmament, the
US and UK
agreed the
final changes to the draft resolution.282
835.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that Mr Lavrov had sought an addition to
OP4
providing
for a material breach to be “reported [to] and assessed by the
Council”, and
had also
expressed concern that the “US wanted the whole Council to accept
some
unpredictable
future event would constitute a material breach”.
836.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock subsequently stated that the purpose of the resolution
was:
“(i) to
clarify and strengthen the inspections regime so that the
disarmament of Iraq’s
WMD, in
accordance with its obligations … could be brought to full and
verified
completion
through this enhanced inspections regime; and (ii) to deliver the
clear‑cut
warning,
one final time, that failure to comply with its disarmament
obligations would,
in
accordance with this resolution, including the procedures specified
in OPs 4,
11 and
12, mean that Iraq will face serious consequences.”
837.
The US and UK
also made clear that the resolution provided for a two
stage
process
with the Council at its centre.
838.
Following
discussion with Washington and agreement with the UK, the
US
delegation
introduced a revised text. The decision that a further material
breach would
be
“reported to the Council in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12”,
not “11 or 12”,
in OP4 was
described as a “substantial change”. At the request of Russia,
“secure”
replaced
“restore” in OP12.
839.
Mr Lavrov
had also asked the US and UK for confirmation that the
“failures”
referred to
in OP4 related to WMD programmes, and to clarify whether they
understood
OP4 to
require a report by UNMOVIC and the IAEA to the Security Council
and then
Council
discussion.
840.
On the last
point, Sir Jeremy had responded that:
“If there
was a further Iraqi breach … the matter would return to the Council
for
discussion
as required under OP12. We would then expect the Security
Council
to meet
its responsibilities.”
841.
Resolution
1441 was adopted on 8 November by a unanimous vote of
the
members of the
Security Council.
282
Telegram
2128 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 8 November 2002, ‘Iraq
Resolution: 7 November’.
343