3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
899.
The FCO Iraq
policy meeting on 3 February was informed that feedback from
the
31 January
meeting indicated that Mr Blair had “persuaded President Bush
to allow time
for a
serious effort to secure a second resolution”; and that
Mr Ricketts would discuss
options and
tactics with Mr Straw.290
900.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diaries that Sir David Manning’s record of the
meeting
with
President Bush:
“… made
pretty clear they [the US] had made their minds up and that the
campaign
was going
to start … For Bush the diplomacy had to be based round the
military
campaign,
not the other way round. We had very short timelines
now.”291
901.
Mr Campbell
added that Mr Blair had told him that the meeting with
President Bush
had been
“the best … they had in terms of substance”. President Bush “had
read and
digested”
Mr Blair’s Notes and “was more on the same page than we
thought, said he
intended to
work hard for a second resolution and work to get a majority for
it”.
902.
Addressing
Mr Blair’s success in getting President Bush to support a
second
resolution
on 31 January, Sir Jeremy Greenstock wrote in his statement
for the Inquiry
that it had
not been easy to get US agreement “because of the spread of views
in
Washington
and because we had already used up much of our ammunition
with
Washington
on the utility of the UN route in securing [resolution]
1441”.292
903.
Sir Jeremy
added: “It was noticeable … that President Bush’s words on this
subject
in public
were rather less warm and specific than those he had used with the
Prime
Minister in
private.”
904.
Sir Jeremy
told the Inquiry that President Bush had told Mr Blair: “We,
ourselves,
don’t
particularly need a second resolution, but we realise that you
do.”293
905.
The record of
the meeting between Mr Blair and President Bush on 31
January
confirms
these elements of Mr Campbell’s and Sir Jeremy
Greenstock’s accounts.294
906.
Mr Campbell
also wrote that Mr Blair was “confident of getting a
second
resolution”;
and he was:
“… adamant
that it was the right thing to do to get rid of Saddam and send out
the
message
that we were determined to deal with WMD. But he knew how tough
it
was going
to be. Expressing confidence in a second resolution was the best
way
of dealing
with that.”
290
Minute
Tanfield to PS/PUS [FCO], 3 February 2003, ‘Iraq Morning Meeting:
Key Points’.
291
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
292
Statement,
November 2009, page 13.
293
Public
hearing, 27 November 2009, page 67.
294
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 31 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with President
Bush on 31
January’.
165