6.5 | Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003

“UK information on Iraqi ministries – structure, numbers, who are good Iraqis to work

with”.386 The official stated that Principals had still not agreed ORHA’s structure in Iraq,

ORHA’s relationship to the UN or to the IIA, or the role of different Iraqi groups in the IIA.

The official also commented that: “ORHA has an overwhelmingly military feel, despite

Gen Garner’s best efforts to be called ‘Mr’.”

927. An IPU official sent Mr Chaplin and Mr Chilcott a set of possible principles to guide

the composition of the IIA on 10 March.387 Those included:

• sensitivity to ethnic and sectarian balance, the secular/religious mix and the role

of tribes, without reinforcing or reinventing divisions in Iraqi society;

• ensuring that diaspora returnees included technocrats and “religious charitable

organisations”;

• remembering that many of the diaspora were in Arab countries; and

• that members of the external opposition “must have hands-on skills and/or real

support within Iraq”.

928. Mr Chaplin agreed with all but the last. He argued that:

“… external oppositionists of any stripe should be free to try their luck back in Iraq.

The Coalition can perhaps judge their skills, but not their political credibility. Only

Iraqis can do that.”388

929. On 10 March, Mr Fraser sent Sir Michael Jay and Mr Ricketts advice on the

implications of military action for the international system.389 Mr Fraser attached a

paper prepared by the Directorate of Strategy and Innovation (DSI) listing “the risks

and opportunities of quick, successful, UN-sanctioned military action leading to the

installation in Iraq of an international administration (ie a best case scenario)”, to “help

us to focus on some of the issues we may confront quite early on the morning after”.390

930. The risks covered Iraq, the region and more general issues. Under “Iraq internal”,

the paper listed:

“– Internal rebellion; major unrest

– External military intervention (eg by Turkey; Iran)

– Power vacuum (providing ideal conditions for criminal elements; drugs; people-

trafficking)

– Iraqi oil fields rendered unusable.”

386 Email [British Embassy Washington junior official] to Chilcott, 6 March 2003, ‘ORHA: reporting’.

387 Email [IPU junior official] to Chilcott, 10 March 2003, ‘ORHA: reporting’.

388 Email Chaplin to Chilcott, 10 March 2003, ‘ORHA: reporting’.

389 Minute Fraser to Jay, 10 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Implications for the International System’.

390 Paper DSI, [undated], ‘Iraq – Risks and Opportunities’.

479