3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
“There are
times when hard choices have to be made. On Iraq, we have
now
reached
such a moment. If we fail to deal with this challenge, the United
Nations
will be
seriously weakened. And that would make the world a much
more
dangerous place.
“As
President Bush spelled out … we have to be resolute in the face of
Iraq’s
defiance as
President Bush said in his excellent speech … and secure the will
of
the United
Nations. We must require Iraq to re‑admit inspectors with
unfettered
access. We
have not just an interest but a responsibility to ensure that Iraq
complies
fully with
international law. We have to be clear to Iraq and to ourselves
about the
consequences
which will flow from a failure by Iraq to meet its
obligations.”
568.
Mr Blair
wrote in his memoir that he had decided during August 2002
that
Saddam had
to be dealt with; and that the one objective of his meeting
with
President
Bush at Camp David on 7 September was to persuade President
Bush
to go to
the UN.
569.
Mr Blair
described that as obtaining a resolution and giving
Saddam
Hussein a
final chance to comply.
570.
In his memoir
Mr Blair described Iraq, and what the UK was going to do about
it,
as, by the
summer of 2002, “an insistent and pervasive
backdrop”.173
He recorded
that
as a result
of 24‑hour media:
“Literally
every day, stories would appear moving the debate this way and that
and
in line
with developing patterns of reporting, always hardening speculation
into fact.
At times we
would not be sure whether we were driving the agenda or being
driven
by it. On
holiday in France in August 2002, I took a call from George, who
was
equally
frustrated by the fact that everyone assumed we had made up our
mind and
that the
march to war was inexorable.”
“When I
returned from holiday … I also had my lines clear. I was going to
be
very tough:
we had to deal with Saddam; it was right to do it; we had to send
an
unvarnished
and plain message to the world.”
572.
Mr Blair
wrote that the Camp David meeting had had one
objective:
“… to get
[President Bush] to go down the UN route, ie to agree that before
any
action we
would pass a UN resolution and give Saddam a final
chance.
173
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
191