6.3 |
Military equipment (pre-conflict)
338.
ACM Bagnall’s
Private Office concluded:
“In sum, if
the start date for land operations is delayed, there will be
greater time
to embody
the required land UORs. However, as I have noted earlier, there
are
no showstoppers.”
339.
The minutes of
the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 29 January recorded that
the
“focus had
shifted to what equipment was being delivered rather than what was
being
procured”.160
It was
important that “all measures were taken” to ensure that
equipment
was fitted
and not just made available. A “coherent plan was required with
clear guidance
on the
division of responsibilities for ensuring equipment was available
to units in theatre”.
340.
There was “a
concern over the availability of desertised Challenger 2s”
and,
although
the Land Component Commander was content with the current
position,
Adm Boyce
“noted that it would clearly be better if availability was improved
as a result
of any slip
in campaign timelines that allowed extra UOR work to be
completed”.
341.
Concerns
about the provision of Combat ID and whether previous
lessons
had been
learned were raised in both Houses of Parliament.
342.
On
18 December 2002, Mr Hoon made a statement in the House
of Commons
on contingency
preparations for possible military action in Iraq.161
343.
Mr Hoon
was asked by Mr Mark Prisk for an assurance that, “given
the
recent
tragic incidents of friendly fire in different theatres of war”,
all deployed UK
service
personnel would have the equipment “they need to communicate
speedily
and effectively
with friendly units”.162
“I thank
the hon. Gentleman for raising a serious and important point. I
assure him
that
efforts are being made to ensure that that is the
case.”
345.
Combat ID was
raised as an issue on 20 December in Lt Gen Pigott’s
UOR
update.163
He stated
that it was:
“ … a
vulnerable issue in presentational terms, particularly following
the NAO report,
but it is
an issue that has not moved forward recently. Resolution has been
thwarted
while the
UK awaits the formulation of US policy by CENTCOM.”
160
Minutes,
29 January 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
161
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 18 December
2002, columns 845-846.
162
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 18 December
2002, column 854.
163
Minute
DCDS(C) to PSO/CDS, 20 December 2002, ‘Iraq Contingency
Planning – Urgent Operational
Requirements
and Related Issues’.
53