4.4 | The
search for WMD
72.
On
16 April, Mr Scarlett informed Sir David Manning of the
content of his
discussions
with CIA officials earlier that day, which covered a number of
issues,
including
the use of available intelligence in the exploitation
process.35
The IAEA’s
15th report on Iraq, covering the period between 1 October
2002 and
1 April
2003, was submitted to the Security Council on 14 April
2003.36
The report
stated:
•
“As of
17 March 2003, the IAEA had found no evidence or plausible
indication of the
revival of
a nuclear weapons programme In Iraq”; but the time available “for
the IAEA
before
inspections were suspended was not sufficient to permit it to
complete its
overall
review and assessment”.
•
“Provided that
Iraq’s co-operation had remained active, and barring
unforeseen
circumstances,
the IAEA would have been able to provide the Security Council
with
credible
assurance regarding the absence of such revival within two to three
months
of
continuing verification activities.”
•
Many areas of
Iraqi expertise seemed to have been significantly depleted, and
the
“core of
expertise” on centrifuge enrichment that existed in 1990 appeared
to have
been
“largely disbanded”.
•
The IAEA,
“with the concurrence of outside experts”, had concluded that
documents
provided
“by a number of States that pointed to an agreement between Niger
and
Iraq on the
sale of uranium to Iraq between 1999 and 2001… were in fact
forged”.
•
The IAEA had
therefore concluded that those specific allegations were
“unfounded”,
but “it
could not be automatically extrapolated … that Iraq had never
sought to import
uranium”.
The IAEA “would continue to investigate the matter”.
•
“Extensive
field investigation and document analysis had failed to uncover
any
evidence”
that the aluminium tubes sought by Iraq were intended for use in
“any
project
other than the reverse engineering of rockets”.
•
“IAEA experts
familiar with the use of … magnets in centrifuge enrichment
have
verified
that none of the magnets that Iraq has declared could be used
directly for a
centrifuge
magnetic bearing”. Investigations with foreign manufacturers
contacted by
Iraq were
“ongoing”.
In relation
to recent events, the IAEA report stated:
•
During the
period under review it had conducted 237 inspections at 148
sites.
Iraq had
provided access to all facilities requested by the IAEA “without
conditions
or delay”.
•
The Iraqi
authorities had made available “over 7,000 pages of additional
…
documentation”
and “a large number of documents” relating to “Iraq’s pre-1991
laser
enrichment
programme were found in the home of a former Iraqi
scientist”.
35
Minute
Scarlett to Manning, 16 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Discussion with CIA
Directorate of Intelligence’.
36
UN Security
Council, ‘Letter dated 14 April 2003 from the
Secretary-General addressed to the President
of the
Council’ attaching ‘Fifteenth consolidated report of the Director
General of the International Atomic
Energy
Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051
(1996)’, S/2003/422.
439