The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

1016.  The Chiefs of Staff discussed the DOC Report on 4 April 2006.537 The lessons

about counter IED, ISTAR and air transport capability were repeated in the minutes.

1017.  The Chiefs discussed ISTAR further, the minutes recording that if the report’s

identification of a serious ISTAR capability gap was “true”, it would need “to be

addressed, possibly through the UOR process, but perhaps more realistically by

reviewing and adjusting as necessary the overall surveillance plan”.

1018.  The minutes stated that not only was ISTAR critical for operations in Afghanistan,

but “a lack of surveillance capability had constrained operations in MND(SE) and would

be critical for maintaining situational awareness in MND(SE) during strategic overwatch”.

In the meantime, the US was “being pressed to provide the UK with a proportional share

of their Predator surveillance output, given that the UK contributed a significant amount”

of the operating costs.

1019.  In discussion the Chiefs of Staff agreed that:

“… appropriate priority and resources were being given to the development of

national Counter Improvised Explosive Device capability … including the possible

use of the UOR process, the criticality of gaps in the UK’s surveillance plan for both

Iraq and Afghanistan … required further analysis, and CDS [Gen Walker] asked

VCDS [Gen Granville‑Chapman] to scope the issue.”

1020.  As “a first step”, Gen Granville‑Chapman wrote to Lt Gen Houghton and

Lt Gen Fulton on 7 April.538 He requested Lt Gen Houghton’s ISTAR assessment for Iraq

and Afghanistan, including:

• “What is the requirement now, what are the shortfalls, how critical are they, and

what is being done to ameliorate them?”

• Given the shift to Operational Overwatch in Iraq and the UK’s enduring

commitment in Afghanistan, what was the “projected requirement likely to be”

and might it even increase when there were fewer boots on the ground? What

plans were in place to address these?

• “How coalition/alliance assets may realistically be able to assist.”

1021.  Looking at how gaps could be filled, Gen Granville‑Chapman suggested

Lt Gen Houghton should consider “the full range of potential solutions”, including

Merlin Mk1F and attack helicopters.

1022.  Gen Granville‑Chapman wrote that ISTAR had also been raised during a

meeting about Afghanistan on 4 April and Gen Walker had “accepted that any new

substantial request for UOR funding in relation to Predator B should not be pursued

for the moment”.

537  Minutes, 4 April 2006, Chief of Staff meeting.

538  Minute VCDS to CJO, 7 April 2006, ‘Quantifying ISTAR Shortfalls on Current Operations’.

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