6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
734.
Lord Goldsmith
said it was for Mr Hoon “to decide, on the basis of military
and
political
advice, the extent to which he should delegate his authority to
approve targets”.
However,
“given the heightened scrutiny of the proposed campaign”, Lord
Goldsmith
emphasised
that Mr Hoon needed to satisfy himself that adequate arrangements
were
in place to
ensure that targets approved under the delegated authority would
fully
comply with
the UK’s obligations under IHL.
735.
Lord Goldsmith
saw no legal objection in principle to delegation “provided
that”:
•
the scope
of the delegation was clearly defined (to protect the position of
the
relevant
commander);
•
clear
instructions were given that the commander to whom authority
was
delegated
was required to comply with IHL;
•
Mr Hoon was
satisfied that arrangements had been made to ensure that
the
commander
to whom authority had been delegated had access both to
adequate
legal
advice on IHL and technical advice from UK targeteers trained in
the
requirements
of IHL; and
•
the public
record, “especially in Parliament”, reflected the reality of the
target
clearance
process and the fact of delegation.
736.
Lord Goldsmith
considered it “unwise” to delegate authority to attack targets
that
would raise
“significant legal issues” or which were “politically sensitive”.
Those targets
should
remain subject to “appropriate political control”.
737.
Mr Hoon needed
to be satisfied that arrangements were in place “to do
everything
feasible to
avoid accidental harm to refuges, humanitarian convoys and other
civilians”.
Lord
Goldsmith stressed the need to ensure that attacks on airports or
air fields did not
impede the
delivery of humanitarian assistance.
738.
Ms Adams wrote
that Lord Goldsmith had considered the process of
approving
targets
under delegated authority, including the arrangements for the
provision of legal
advice, as
explained in Mr Hemming’s letter.
739.
Lord Goldsmith
believed that the proposed delegation in the Targeting
Directive
was
“acceptable” subject to seven points where he suggested amendments
or
clarification.
740.
One of those
points was Lord Goldsmith’s understanding that the
Targeting
Directive
would be issued “for the time being without delegated authority to
attack
individual
members of the Iraqi regime”.
741.
Such targets
were likely to be “highly politically sensitive” and Mr Hoon
should
consider
very carefully whether to delegate authority for those targets. If
Mr Hoon
were minded
to do so, Lord Goldsmith requested further briefing on the
considerations
Mr Hoon
believed would justify the targeting of specific individuals and
recommended
that Mr
Straw was involved in any consideration of the issue.
505