9.4 | June 2005 to May 2006

could be high, but neither side had the capacity to deliver a decisive level of combat

power. Violence was concentrated in Baghdad and areas around it; other parts of

country could be peaceful.

617. Civil war would further complicate the coalition’s mission, which was already

balanced, “rather uneasily”, between counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism.

618. Lt Gen Fry wrote:

“We can talk ourselves into civil war, but my assessment is that we are some

way short of it at the moment. More importantly, given the limitations in sectarian

interface and combat power, it is difficult to see the condition in which civil war

would be an appropriate description. I judge that we are currently in a condition

of sectarian conflict characterised by insidious but relatively limited violence, and

that an escalation into the larger scale operations prosecuted by more formally

defined military entities which would constitute civil war is unlikely. This is not just

military semantics: civil war is an emotive, inflammatory and technically inaccurate

description, and we need to say so. A clear message to our domestic audience,

coalition partners and the Iraqi political classes would put the record straight, counter

speculation and stiffen the resolve of those in need of reassurance.”

619. Lieutenant General Sir Robert Fry told the Inquiry:

“I see this with greater clarity in retrospect, but I think at the time what was actually

happening is that incoherent insurgency was becoming much more coherent, and

also there were reciprocal acts of provocation and violence between the Sunni and

the Shia communities which were leading to this rapidly escalating process … it

looked very much like civil war at the time.”298

620. Dr Reid visited Iraq from 17 to 20 March, beginning in Baghdad and then spending

time in the South.299

621. In discussion with Gen Casey, Dr Reid noted that there had been “a real retreat

into sectarianism” in Iraq. Gen Casey agreed, but was of the view that Iraq was not in

the grip of civil war. He listed five conditions that would have to be met for a state of civil

war to exist:

“• It had to be widespread …

• It had to be sustained …

• It had to be intense …

• The Government would have to fail …

• The Armed Forces also had to fail …”

298 Public hearing, 16 December 2009, page 103.

299 Minute McNeil to PS/Policy Director, 21 March 2006, ‘Secretary of State’s Visit to Iraq’.

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