The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

44. Sir David Manning had asked Mr John Scarlett, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence

Committee (JIC), for “an analysis of the state of opinion in Iraq” and whether there were

“really segments of the population who might be willing to rise against Saddam … David

was sceptical. He also mentioned work … on the … INC [Iraqi National Congress].”15

45. Mr Wright informed the meeting of the JIC on 13 February that US policy towards

Iraq was “going to be the dominant one for relationships with US and Europe over the

next few weeks”.16 The Embassy in Washington had produced a “paper drawing together

all available information” which was circulated to JIC members.

46. In the discussion the following points were made:

• Policy discussions between US Principals were expected in the next 10-14 days

but there was no evidence that anything sudden or unexpected would happen.

• US air supremacy “could be quick to secure, but the assembly of a large enough

force to bind measures together would take much longer”.

• “In the meantime Saddam had a number of options open to him to queer the

US pitch.”

47. JIC members were invited to “share quickly” any useful analysis or information they

received.

48. The date and context of the JIC discussion suggests that Mr Wright was referring

to Sir Christopher Meyer’s telegram of 13 February, received in London that morning.17

49. Sir David Manning told the Inquiry that:

“… Dr Rice had confirmed … that the Administration was indeed looking at options,

but said that there was absolutely no plan at this stage. It was an effort to redefine

policy.”18

50. Mr Jonathan Powell, Mr Blair’s Chief of Staff, told the Inquiry that “it was February

and March that they [the US] started to get into more concrete plans … for considering

how they would actually deal with Iraq”.19 Sir David Manning had spoken to Dr Rice on

14 February to make sure:

“… the Americans would not plunge into any plans before the Prime Minister met the

President at Crawford and received an assurance that they wouldn’t.”

51. The record of the discussion confirms that Sir David Manning told Dr Rice that US

policy on Iraq “continued to be a source of intense speculation in the British media, as

15 Minute Ehrman to Goulty, 13 February 2002, ‘US/Iraq’.

16 Minutes, 13 February 2002, JIC meeting.

17 Telegram 197 Washington to FCO London, 13 February 2002, ‘US/IRAQ: The Momentum Builds’.

18 Public hearing, 30 November 2009, pages 10-11.

19 Public hearing, 18 January 2010, pages 17-18.

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