10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
895.
The ISG
discussed a further draft strategy for Iraq on 14
February.525
Mr McDonald
again
emphasised that Mr Brown was focused on achieving economic
effect in 2008,
and that
the UK should make every effort to do so in the limited time
available.
896.
On 18
February, Lt Gen Rollo reported that Gen Petraeus had asked to
see
Mr Wareing
during his upcoming visit to Iraq.526
The meeting
would be a useful
opportunity
to explain how the BDC would deliver on “what Petraeus sees as a
British
commitment
to kick-start the economy of the South”. Gen Petraeus believed
that
campaign
success in Iraq depended on the regeneration of the country’s
economy.
897.
Lt Gen Rollo
assessed that the UK could do more to support Mr Wareing
and,
by
extension, economic development in the South. This included
establishing a Basra
Development
Office in Baghdad “to leverage US and Iraqi initiatives and work to
remove
the many
legal and political obstacles to investment in Basra”.
898.
Mr Wareing
made his first visit to Basra on 18 and 19 February, to participate
in the
first
meeting of the BDC.527
Maj Gen
White-Spunner described the visit as “excellent”:
Mr Wareing
had met Governor Waili and had had a genuine exchange of views with
his
Iraqi
colleagues at the BDC and key opinion formers. The BDC had agreed
to produce
a Basra
Economic Development Strategy by June 2008, with the aim of
stimulating the
economy and
fostering private sector development.
899.
Mr Wareing
was unable to travel to Baghdad to meet Gen Petraeus because
of
900.
Section 9.6
describes the deteriorating security situation in Basra from the
end
of January,
and the development by the Iraqi Government of plans to confront
militias
in Basra.
901.
Mr Alexander
agreed on 20 February to increase DFID’s security
headcount
limit (the
number of staff allowed in post at any one time) from seven to nine
for Basra
and from
five to six for Baghdad.529
The new
post in Baghdad would have specific
responsibility
for facilitating the Basra economic initiatives. A DFID official
advised that
the
increase:
“… should
be characterised as organising ourselves to give the Basra
economic
initiatives
the best chance of delivering in the shortest timeframe. It is not
a ‘surge’
but nor is
it business as usual.”
525
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to McDonald, 15 February 2008,
‘Iraq Strategy Group,
14 February’.
526
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 18 February 2008, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (288) 17
Feb 08’.
527
Letter
White-Spunner to CJO, 21 February 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter
– 21 February 2008’.
528
Manuscript
comment on Letter White-Spunner to CJO, 21 February 2008, ‘GOC
MND(SE) Weekly
Letter – 21
February 2008’.
529
Minute DFID
[junior official] to PS/Secretary of State [DFID], 20 February
2008, ‘Iraq: Delivering the
Basra
Economic Initiatives’.
341