The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

74. The JIC examined the state of Sunni politics in Iraq in an Assessment of 11 June.24

It confirmed a December 2007 judgement that, despite having worked together to oust

AQ‑I, there was little sign the Sunni community had rallied to a single political party

or cause.

75. The JIC judged that Sunni participation in the forthcoming provincial elections was

likely to be:

“… considerably higher than in 2005. Sunni expectations are high and are unlikely

to be met by the opportunities that political participation offers. Alienation will grow

unless Prime Minister Maliki’s government addresses their concerns.”

76. The JIC judged that Sunni politicians commanded little support from “the Sunni

street” and that “established Sunni parties’ low credibility and growing competition

for votes will probably render them less dominant in national Sunni politics”.

77. The JIC judged that “Iraq’s Arab neighbours are not driving Iraqi Sunni politics”.

78. The JIC assessed that immediate Sunni concerns were focused on seeing security

gains translate into more jobs and better public services. Other common goals included

increased representation in the ISF and in the government; the release of Sunni

detainees; revision of the de-Ba’athification laws; constitutional review; a timetable for

the withdrawal of the MNF; and resisting Shia and Kurdish moves towards federalism.

79. The JIC assessed that Sunni insurgent groups were increasingly interested in

the potential gains from political engagement, but saw such engagement “as additional

to, not instead of, armed resistance”. There was no sign that any such group had a

coherent or realistic set of national political objectives.

80. On 11 June, Sir Mark Lyall-Grant, FCO Director General Political, circulated to

members of the FCO Board a paper on ‘Preparing for the End-Game in Basra’.25

The paper set out an analysis of the impact of the Charge of the Knights:

“– Maliki’s failure to consult us, and his well-publicised refusal to receive British

officers during the first week when things were going badly for the ISF, made

it hard for us to sustain our claims that we were co-operating closely with the

GoI on Basra, and that our military overwatch role was welcomed and valued

by the Iraqis.

– the increased MNC-I (ie the US military) presence on the ground created a

mistaken but widespread perception in the US, and in the international media,

that we had abdicated to the US our post-PIC [Provisional Iraqi Control]

responsibilities for providing in extremis support for the ISF.

24 JIC Assessment, 11 June 2008, ‘Iraq: Sunni Arab Politics’.

25 Email Lyall-Grant to Ricketts, 11 June 2008, ‘Board endgame paper’ attaching Paper Iraq Group,

June 2008, ‘Iraq: Preparing for the End-Game in Basra’.

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